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ARTIFICIAL STUPIDITY
CLARK D. ASAY*
ABSTRACT
Artificial intelligence is everywhere. And yet, the experts tell us, it
is not yet actually anywhere. This is because we are yet to achieve
artificial general intelligence, or artificially intelligent systems that
are capable of thinking for themselves and adapting to their
circumstances. Instead, all the AI hype—and it is constant—concerns
narrower, weaker forms of artificial intelligence, which are confined
to performing specific, narrow tasks. The promise of true artificial
general intelligence thus remains elusive. Artificial stupidity reigns
supreme.
What is the best set of policies to achieve more general, stronger
forms of artificial intelligence? Surprisingly, scholars have paid little
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attention to this question. Scholars have spent considerable time
assessing a number of important legal questions relating to artificial
intelligence, including privacy, bias, tort, and intellectual property
issues. But little effort has been devoted to exploring what set of
policies is best suited to helping artificial intelligence developers
achieve greater levels of innovation. And examining such issues is not
some niche exercise, because artificial intelligence has already or
soon will affect every sector of society. Hence, the question goes to the
heart of future technological innovation policy more broadly.
This Article examines this question by exploring how well
intellectual property rights promote innovation in artificial intelli-
gence. I focus on intellectual property rights because they are often
viewed as the most important piece of United States innovation
policy. Overall, I argue that intellectual property rights, particularly
patents, are ill-suited to promote more radical forms of artificial
intelligence innovation. And even the intellectual property types that
are a better fit for artificial intelligence innovators, such as trade
secrecy, come with problems of their own. In fact, the poor fit of
patents in particular may contribute to heavy industry consolidation
in the AI field, and heavy consolidation in an industry is typically
associated with lower than ideal levels of innovation.
I conclude by arguing, however, that neither strengthening AI
patent rights nor looking to other forms of law, such as antitrust,
holds much promise in achieving more general forms of artificial
intelligence. Instead, as with many earlier radical innovations,
significant government backing, coupled with an engaged entrepre-
neurial sector, is at least one key to avoiding enduring artificial
stupidity.
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INTRODUCTION
Forms of artificial intelligence (AI)—computing systems that
perform tasks that normally would require human intelligence—are
everywhere.1 AI determines what appears in our news feeds,2 which
ads we are served,3 our search results,4 and how personal assistants
such as Siri and Alexa respond to us.5 AI also increasingly deter-
mines our credit scores,6 mortgage and loan interest rates,7
1. To be clear, AI is an acronym that means many different things to many different
people. See, e.g., Michael Jordan, Artificial Intelligence—The Revolution Hasn’t Happened Yet,
MEDIUM (Apr. 19, 2018), https://medium.com/@mijordan3/artificial-intelligence-the-revolution-
hasnt-happened-yet-5e1d5812e1e7 [https://perma.cc/693C-5FPY] (discussing how the AI
acronym is often used to mean things, such as machine learning, that aren’t technically AI,
at least as understood in certain disciplines such as computer science); Bernard Marr, The Key
Definitions of Artificial Intelligence (AI) that Explain Its Importance, FORBES (Feb. 14, 2018,
1:27 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/02/14/the-key-definitions-of-artifi
cial-intelligence-ai-that-explain-its-importance/ [https://perma.cc/V3PH-J7J2] (discussing a
variety of different understandings of what AI constitutes). When I refer to AI in this Article,
I mean to do so broadly, because the innovation policy ramifications that I discuss herein
apply to that broader conception, not just what specific disciplines more narrowly mean when
they use the AI acronym. 
2. Google Pushes Artificial Intelligence for Upgraded News App, PHYS.ORG (May 20,
2018), https://phys.org/news/2018-05-google-artificial-intelligence-news-app.html [https://
perma.cc/TT58-K6WA] (discussing Google’s use of AI in structuring its newsfeed).
3. Mike Kaput, What You Need to Know About AI and the Future of Advertising,
MARKETING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE INST. (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.marketingai
institute.com/blog/ai-in-advertising-what-you-need-to-know [https://perma.cc/2BH8-V9YX]
(discussing the role of AI in advertising).
4. Mike Kaput, How Search Engines Use Artificial Intelligence, MARKETING ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE INST. (May 6, 2018), https://www.marketingaiinstitute.com/blog/how-search-
engines-use-artificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/ASQ3-BMHW] (discussing the role of AI
in search). 
5. Alistair Charlton, Hello, Computer: As Alexa Soars and Siri Flags, What’s Next for the
Virtual Assistant?, GEARBRAIN (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.gearbrain.com/alex-siri-ai-virtual-
assistant-2510997337.html [https://perma.cc/6MHQ-9DFN] (discussing the growing impor-
tance of automated personal assistants).
6. Penny Crosman, Is AI Making Credit Scores Better, or More Confusing?, AM. BANKER
(Feb. 14, 2017, 3:35 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/is-ai-making-credit-scores-
better-or-more-confusing [https://perma.cc/LHG3-89UZ] (discussing the role of AI in deter-
mining credit scores).
7. Charles Lane, Will Using Artificial Intelligence to Make Loans Trade One Kind of Bias
for Another?, NPR (Mar. 31, 2017, 5:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/
2017/03/31/521946210/will-using-artificial-intelligence-to-make-loans-trade-one-kind-of-bias-
for-anot [https://perma.cc/UFU4-D26E] (discussing the growing role of AI systems in de-
termining who gets which loans, and at which rates). 
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insurance premiums,8 how much we pay for goods and services,9
where our money is invested,10 and our job prospects.11 In the
criminal justice context, AI plays a growing role in determining who
to police and, ultimately, what criminal sanctions to impose.12 AI
plays a vital role in foreign intelligence and national security
matters as well.13 AI is projected to affect every industry and sector
of society, if it has not already;14 it is fast becoming the most
important technological development in some time.15 Indeed, some
8. Edmund Zagorin, Artificial Intelligence in Insurance—Three Trends that Matter,
EMERJ (June 10, 2019), https://emerj.com/ai-sector-overviews/artificial-intelligence-in-
insurance-trends/ [https://perma.cc/9AA8-K3G4] (discussing the growing use of AI in the
insurance industry).
9. Charlie Osborne, Uber Uses Artificial Intelligence to Figure Out Your Personal Price
Hike, ZDNET (May 22, 2017, 5:30 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/uber-uses-artificial-
intelligence-to-figure-out-your-personal-price-hike/ [https://perma.cc/TD4P-V3H4] (discussing
how Uber uses AI to determine how much users pay).
10. Alex Veiga, Trust the Machines? These Funds Are Run by Artificial Intelligence,
SEATTLE TIMES (July 7, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/trust-the-
machines-these-funds-are-run-by-artificial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/5TM4-XAPU]
(discussing the role of AI systems in making investment decisions and contrasting this AI-
centric approach with “conventional” algorithmic trading and robo-advisers, which are also
earlier forms of AI systems).
11. Amazon Ditched AI Recruiting Tool that Favored Men for Technical Jobs, GUARDIAN
(Oct. 10, 2018, 7:42 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/oct/10/amazon-hiring-
ai-gender-bias-recruiting-engine [https://perma.cc/J3R4-DLUK] (discussing the use of AI in
recruiting by Amazon, and how the company ultimately eliminated a particular use because
it was resulting in gender bias in hiring).
12. See, e.g., Christopher Rigano, Using Artificial Intelligence to Address Criminal Justice
Needs, NAT’L INST. JUST. (Oct. 8, 2018), https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/using-artificial-
intelligence-address-criminal-justice-needs [https://perma.cc/H9RM-Z88Z] (discussing the use
of AI in the criminal justice context); Vincent Southerland, With AI and Criminal Justice, the
Devil Is in the Data, ACLU (Apr. 9, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-tech
nology/surveillance-technologies/ai-and-criminal-justice-devil-data [https://perma.cc/43RX-
MCG6].
13. Michael Horowitz et al., Artificial Intelligence and International Security, CTR. FOR
NEW AM. SECURITY (July 10, 2018), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/artificial-
intelligence-and-international-security [https://perma.cc/QN78-Q4DW] (discussing the roles
of AI in international security); Mara Karlin, The Implications of Artificial Intelligence for
National Security Strategy, BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/
research/the-implications-of-artificial-intelligence-for-national-security-strategy/ [https://
perma.cc/4JV8-CM7H] (discussing the future of AI in national security).
14. Norm Judah, The Global Impact of AI Across Industries, MICROSOFT (July 30, 2018),
https://news.microsoft.com/transform/the-global-impact-of-ai-across-industries/ [https://perma.
cc/E6A2-MTGS] (“Artificial Intelligence (AI) is already having a transformative impact across
every industry.” (emphasis omitted)).
15. Chad Steelberg, Why Artificial Intelligence Will Shift Human Innovation into
Overdrive, FORBES (May 10, 2018, 7:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/
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have dubbed AI the most central part of the “fourth industrial
revolution.”16
Because of its growing ubiquity and importance, AI has attracted
the attention of legal scholars.17 Privacy scholars, for instance, have
largely bemoaned the lack of transparency and accountability
associated with AI systems, with one prominent scholar referring to
the world that we now live in as a “Black Box Society.”18 Other
scholars have worried about the biases that afflict many AI
systems,19 and yet others have analyzed who should take responsi-
bility when AI runs amok.20 Intellectual Property (IP) scholars have
also examined a number of important IP-related questions,21
including whether IP rights should apply to the products of these
autonomous, automated systems.22 Are patents and copyrights
justified, for instance, in cases where the AI system, rather than a
human subject, creates the outputs?23
Despite this attention, many crucial questions remain. What, for
instance, is the best innovation policy for spurring radical AI
innovation? If AI is the most important technological development
2018/05/10/why-artificial-intelligence-will-shift-human-innovation-into-overdrive/ [https://
perma.cc/23QT-S4NS] (“Civilization has reached a major inflection point, with the
development of artificial intelligence technology triggering a massive acceleration in the pace
of human innovation.”).
16. Alan Crameri, Artificial Intelligence: The Fourth Industrial Revolution, INFO. AGE
(Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.information-age.com/artificial-intelligence-fourth-industrial-revolu
tion-123475170/ [https://perma.cc/S53V-SZFP].
17. See, e.g., Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s
Implicit Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 579, 583 (2018); Harry Surden, Machine Learning
and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 88 (2014) (discussing use of machine learning in the practice
of law).
18. FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY 3 (2015).
19. Levendowski, supra note 17, at 583.
20. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 515
(2015).
21. Ryan Abbott, Everything Is Obvious, 66 UCLA L. REV. 2, 8 (2019) (arguing that AI in
time will render nearly all innovations obvious, thereby obviating patent law in its current
form).
22. See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Ex Machina: Copyright Protection for Computer-
Generated Works, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 251, 253 (2016); Pamela Samuelson, Allocating
Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185, 1186-87 (1986)
(discussing whether copyright rights should attach to the creations of AI systems).
23. Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent
Law, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1079, 1080 (2016); Ben Hattenback & Joshua Glucoft, Patents in an Era
of Infinite Monkeys and Artificial Intelligence, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 32, 46 (2015).
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in some time, as some claim,24 then better understanding what
innovation policies are best suited to ensure its success is vital.
Otherwise, artificial stupidity, rather than true artificial general
intelligence, will continue as the norm.25 Indeed, despite the
incessant hype about and ever-growing uses of AI, many AI experts
lament a lack of any real progress in the AI space.26 As one such
expert recently opined, “People worry that computers will get too
smart and take over the world, but the real problem is that they’re
too stupid and they’ve already taken over the world.”27 While access
to vast amounts of processing power and data have enabled
applications of some basic AI techniques to perform specific tasks,
a more general form of AI, capable of thinking for itself beyond
those specific tasks, still eludes us.28 Our computerized world is thus
plagued with an artificial stupidity confined to carrying out
particular, narrow tasks, and not often very well.29 This is not to
claim, of course, that narrower, weak forms of AI are not often quite
valuable—we all benefit from them in a variety of ways.30 But it is
to say that realizing the full potential of AI—by acheiving stronger,
more general forms of AI—requires us to examine how best to spur
its further development.
24. See, e.g., Crameri, supra note 16.
25. See, e.g., Will Knight, Progress in AI Isn’t as Impressive as You Might Think, MIT
TECH. REV. (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609611/progress-in-ai-isnt-
as-impressive-as-you-might-think/ [https://perma.cc/G747-ET8N]; Melanie Mitchell, Artificial
Intelligence Hits the Barrier of Meaning, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/11/05/opinion/artificial-intelligence-machine-learning.html [https://perma.cc/DM7V-
8AUH] (discussing the lack of true general AI).
26. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 25.
27. PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM 286 (2015).
28. James Vincent, This Is When AI’s Top Researchers Think Artificial General
Intelligence Will Be Achieved, VERGE (Nov. 27, 2018, 1:05 PM), https://www.theverge.com/
2018/11/27/18114362/ai-artificial-general-intelligence-when-achieved-martin-ford-book
[https://perma.cc/P2ZE-B37J].
29. See, e.g., James Vincent, Google ‘Fixed’ Its Racist Algorithm by Removing Gorillas from
Its Image-Labeling Tech, VERGE (Jan. 12, 2018, 10:35 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/
12/16882408/google-racist-gorillas-photo-recognition-algorithm-ai [https://perma.cc/67CK-
DMVN].
30. See, e.g., Ben Dickson, What Is Narrow, General, and Super Artificial Intelligence,
TECHTALKS (May 12, 2017), https://bdtechtalks.com/2017/05/12/what-is-narrow-general-and-
super-artificial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/2GUA-QWYR] (discussing some of the benefits
of narrow AI).
1194 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1187
Scholarly conversations about how best to incentivize AI innova-
tion have been lacking.31 Some of this neglect may owe to the fact
that AI systems are comprised of software, hardware, data, and
other technologies that have been around for some time.32 Hence,
whatever innovation policies we have had for these types of
technologies may be good enough for the AI systems that utilize
them. But in this Article, I argue that the nature of many AI
systems challenges some of the basic assumptions underlying
traditional United States innovation policy as reflected in its
intellectual property laws, thus necessitating a reexamination of
several of those assumptions. And doing so is not some niche
exercise, because AI is not some niche technology. Instead, because
AI increasingly pervades nearly every major modern-day technologi-
cal system,33 the innovation policy ramifications that I discuss in
this Article will tend to apply more broadly to technological de-
velopment in general.
Traditionally, IP laws form a vital, and perhaps the most
important, part of United States innovation policy.34 Hence, this
Article examines several different forms of IP rights, including
patents, trade secrecy, and copyrights, and assesses how each is
likely to affect developers of AI systems. Doing so reveals a number
of important implications for AI and technological innovation going
forward.
31. For an exception in the pharmaceutical context, see W. Nicholson Price II, Big Data,
Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1401, 1405 (2016) (discussing, among
other things, a number of shortcomings in innovation policy in the health care context,
particularly in light of increasing reliance on AI systems).
32. See, e.g., Stefano Ambrogio, The Future of AI Needs Hardware Accelerators Based on
Analog Memory Devices, PHYS.ORG (June 14, 2018), https://phys.org/news/2018-06-future-ai-
hardware-based-analog.html [https://perma.cc/Y57Z-SCGT] (describing various hardware,
software, and data needs for improving today’s AI technologies).
33. See, e.g., Saryu Nayyar, AI Is Taking Over Our Lives—When Will It Arrive in
Cybersecurity?, FORBES (June 1, 2018, 7:15 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestech
council/2018/06/01/ai-is-taking-over-our-lives-when-will-it-arrive-in-cybersecurity/ [https://
perma.cc/9KE6-92VM] (describing the growing pervasiveness of AI technologies in our daily
lives).
34. Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause's External Limitations, 61 DUKE
L.J. 1329, 1331-32 (2012) (arguing that the Constitution’s IP Clause limits Congress’s
authority “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” other than through
intellectual property laws).
2020] ARTIFICIAL STUPIDITY 1195
First, patent law, often viewed as a key vehicle for incentivizing
inventive innovation,35 is often a poor fit for incentivizing radical AI
innovation. This is so for a number of reasons, including the
Supreme Court’s recent patentable subject matter rulings that have
made effectively patenting software innovations, of which AI
innovations are a subset, more difficult.36
Second, trade secrecy, often viewed as the primary alternative to
patent protection, provides AI developers with several key advan-
tages in comparison to patent protection.37 For instance, keeping an
AI system’s technical details under wraps is often a key competitive
advantage because doing so can provide significant lead-time
advantages.38 Trade secrecy allows AI developers to keep their
systems secret, whereas patenting the same invention requires
disclosure of key technical details as part of the patenting process.39
Furthermore, even in cases where parties may prefer patent pro-
tection,40 the relative ineffectiveness of AI patent protection means
that more AI innovators are likely to choose trade secrecy over
patent protection for their AI innovations. Thus, trade secrecy is
35. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247,
247-48 (1994) (identifying the patent system’s main goal as promoting research and
development (R&D) innovation).
36. Lauren Hockett & Vlad Teplitskiy, Post-Alice Section 101 Eligibility Roadmap for
Software Inventions, KNOBBE MARTENS (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.knobbe.com/news/2016/
12/post-alice-section-101-eligibility-roadmap-software-inventions [https://perma.cc/43C8-
E4NE]. In fact, the subject matter difficulties that recent Supreme Court decisions introduced
go beyond software. See Susan Y. Tull & Paula E. Miller, Patenting Artificial Intelligence:
Issues of Obviousness, Inventorship, and Patent Eligibility, 1 J. ROBOTICS, ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE & L. 313, 316 (2018) (discussing subject matter problems in the context of
medicinal products).
37. Of course, trade secrecy and patent protection can coexist in a number of important
contexts. See Brenda M. Simon & Ted Sichelman, Data-Generating Patents, 111 NW. U. L.
REV. 377, 379 (2017) (describing the typical account of trade secrecy as an economic substitute
to patent protection, while pointing to instances where trade secrecy functions as an economic
complement instead). But for reasons discussed in greater detail below, AI developers face
growing challenges in maintaining both trade secrecy and patent protection for important
parts of their AI systems. See infra Parts I.A.-B.
38. PASQUALE, supra note 18, at 83.
39. Orly Lobel, Filing for a Patent Versus Keeping Your Invention a Trade Secret, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Nov. 21, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/11/filing-for-a-patent-versus-keeping-your-
invention-a-trade-secret [https://perma.cc/2ZJ5-HRA9].
40. This may be, for instance, because of trade secrecy’s relative weaknesses. See, e.g.,
Jonathan C. Lipson, Remote Control: Revised Article 9 and the Negotiability of Information,
63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1327, 1355-56 (2002) (reviewing some of the common weaknesses of trade
secret protection).
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increasingly displacing patent protection as the preferred form of
legal protection in a growing number of AI contexts.41
Third, these IP realities mean that the AI industry is likely to
become increasingly consolidated as a limited number of large, in-
cumbent firms dominate it.42 The reasons for this relate both to the
IP choices available to industry participants as well as the nature
of AI innovation in general. For instance, in industries with “weak
appropriability regimes,” large incumbent firms have an easier time
fending off would-be competitors in part because ineffective patent
protection means the potential rivals have greater difficulty re-
alizing the value of their innovations.43 Ineffective patent protection
is also likely to contribute to higher costs of parties doing business
with each other, so that market participants are more likely to
“vertically integrate” than strike arms-length deals in the market-
place.44 Furthermore, large, incumbent AI firms control important
“complementary assets” necessary for running AI systems, such as
large troves of data and access to computational power.45 This all
means that instead of numerous small, nimble AI companies forg-
ing ahead in developing innovative, new AI products and services,
large incumbent firms are likely to increasingly monopolize the AI
space. In fact, as this Article details, we already see some evidence
of such a vertically integrated AI industry developing.46
41. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Machines as the New Oompa-Loompas: Trade Secrecy, the
Cloud, Machine Learning, and Automation, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 706, 712 (2019) (discussing this
preference for trade secrecy).
42. See John Stuckey & David White, When and When Not to Vertically Integrate,
MCKINSEY Q. (Aug. 1993), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-
corporate-finance/our-insights/when-and-when-not-to-vertically-integrate [https://perma.cc/
B7AY-CWWX] (discussing what vertical integration in an industry entails).
43. Anita M. McGahan & Brian S. Silverman, Profiting from Technological Innovation by
Others: The Effect of Competitor Patenting on Firm Value, 35 RES. POL’Y 1222, 1222, 1224
(2006) (pointing to empirical evidence showing that weak patent rights in an industry can
increase incumbent firm’s value because that weakness means that spillover effects
predominate “market-stealing” effects).
44. See David T. Levy, The Transactions Cost Approach to Vertical Integration: An
Empirical Examination, 67 REV. ECON. & STAT. 438, 438-39 (1985) (reviewing some of the
theoretical development behind the transaction cost theory behind vertical integration).
45. See David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for
Integration, Collaboration, Licensing, and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285, 285, 288 (1986)
(pointing to the importance of complementary assets and arguing that their owners are often
better able to realize the value of industry-wide innovations). 
46. William Vorhies, Comparing AI Strategies—Vertical vs. Horizontal, DATA SCI. CENT.
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Finally, AI industry consolidation is likely to result in greater AI
innovation inefficiencies and, thus, ongoing artificial stupidity,
because a good amount of evidence shows that smaller, more nimble
firms are typically more innovative than larger ones.47 Hence, in
order to best promote more far-reaching AI development, our
innovation policy is in need of some changes, and this Article briefly
explores some potential solutions, including strengthening AI
patents48 and resorting to other sources of law such as antitrust.49
However, I conclude that neither solution holds much promise.
Instead, I point to significant government backing as the best
candidate for helping AI innovators ultimately achieve more general
forms of AI.50
This Article has three parts. Part I examines the three bodies of
IP law that are most directly relevant to AI development. It argues
that patents are a poor fit for many AI systems and that reality has
a number of important ramifications, including a greater reliance on
trade secrecy and copyright. Part II then examines how these IP
realities are likely to affect AI industrial organization over time. It
suggests that the nature of many AI systems and the IP protections
available for them are likely to result in significant vertical
integration and, thus, heavy industrial consolidation. The result of
such industry consolidation, in turn, is likely to be enduring
artificial stupidity. Part III examines some potential solutions to
these issues.
(July 17, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.datasciencecentral.com/profiles/blogs/comparing-ai-
strategies-vertical-vs-horizontal [https://perma.cc/LCP4-9J4D] (reporting that in 2017, “of the
120 AI [start-ups] that exited the market, 115 did so by acquisition,” with the majority of
those acquisitions being done by nine large technology companies).
47. Peter Lee, Innovation and the Firm: A New Synthesis, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1490-91
(2018); Robert P. Merges, Patent Markets and Innovation in the Era of Big Platform
Companies (Feb. 28, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3340648
[https://perma.cc/A63R-KMF8].
48. See infra Part III.A.
49. See infra Part III.B.
50. See infra Part III.C.
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I. IP FOR AI
Patents, trade secrecy, and copyright are the three most relevant
bodies of IP law for protecting AI systems.51 Below I consider each
of them in turn.
A. Patents
Patents provide parties with a number of possible benefits.
Historically, a patent’s primary theoretical purpose is to incentivize
parties to undertake socially beneficial activities that, absent the
patent, the parties would forego.52 These utilitarian theories posit
that without the rights of exclusivity that come with a patent,
parties would be reluctant to develop inventions because third
parties could replicate the inventions without incurring the same
costs.53 Hence, by granting the inventor an ability to prevent others
from making, using, and selling the invention, a patent allows the
inventor to recoup her costs of invention.54 In so doing, a patent thus
provides inventors with the necessary economic incentives to pursue
socially beneficial activities.55 And, though it is far from clear
whether patents actually perform these functions in the aggregate,
these theories remain an important basis for why we have patents.56
51. Trademarks are undoubtedly also an important form of intellectual property
protection for AI firms. But this Article focuses on the intellectual property forms that are
most relevant to directly incentivizing AI development, and trademark protection’s link to
incentivizing AI development is, at best, indirect. See generally Mark P. McKenna, The
Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1844 (2007)
(summarizing the historical theoretical justifications underlying trademark law).
52. Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 736 (2012)
(“We grant patents ... to encourage inventions we wouldn’t otherwise get.”); Stephen
Yelderman, Coordination-Focused Patent Policy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1565, 1566-67 (2016). 
53. See Yelderman, supra note 52, at 1566.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. After studying the patent system for a number of years, Fritz Machlup is famous for
remarking that
[i]f we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of
our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting
one. But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be
irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing
it.
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A related strand of patent law theory posits that patents provide
an important coordination mechanism in the marketplace. For
instance, patent rights may encourage parties to disclose informa-
tion about their inventions to third parties because patents reduce
their risks of so doing.57 Patents may also communicate useful
information to the market, and that information may facilitate any
number of socially productive activities.58 Hence, in addition to
incentivizing invention, patents may also “grease the wheels” of a
variety of beneficial commercial activities.
In this vein, some argue that strong patents enable greater
economic efficiencies by reducing transaction costs between parties,
thereby promoting greater economic specialization and industrial
disaggregation.59 That specialization and disaggregation, in turn,
are said to promote innovation, as smaller, more nimble industry
players are able to better compete in the marketplace.60
Do patents perform these roles? That is an empirical question
that neither this Article, nor any existing research, can easily
answer. As far back as the late 1950s, Professor Fritz Machlup
famously described the evidence as ambiguous at best,61 and some
commentators believe that the equivocal state of affairs remains
intact.62 But, as discussed in greater detail below, there are several
STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, 85TH CONG., AN
ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 80 (Comm. Print 1958) (Patent Study of Fritz
Machlup). His sentiment is often pointed to as a poignant summary of the state of opinion
regarding whether the patent system serves its intended purposes. 
57. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1477, 1496, 1503 (2005) (arguing that property rights such as patents help reduce
the risk of disclosing sensitive information in the marketplace).
58. See, e.g., Clark D. Asay, The Informational Value of Patents, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
259, 265, 276-77 (2016) (discussing the ways in which patents are often used to communicate
information about the patent holders to product, capital, and labor markets); Colleen V.
Chien, Opening the Patent System: Diffusionary Levers in Patent Law, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 793,
804-05, 826, 846 (2016) (discussing a number of ways the patent system might be used to
better diffuse technical information throughout the marketplace).
59. See infra Part II.
60. See infra Part II.
61. STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, supra note 56.
62. See, e.g., Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 76
(2015) (concluding that none of the current evidence that we have regarding the patent system
“resolves whether patents have a net positive effect on innovation, much less their net welfare
effect, or whether alternative innovation incentives such as grants, prizes, and tax credits are
inferior”).
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reasons to believe that patents are a poor fit for many types of AI
innovation, including stronger forms of AI. First, patenting
standards make patenting important parts of many AI systems
difficult and in some cases impossible. Second, patenting require-
ments present a number of significant disadvantages to many AI
innovators, such that many AI innovators are likely to choose to
forego patent protection for their AI innovations altogether. As a
result, the future of AI innovation may be one lacking whatever
benefits patents provide. Such a development may be beneficial in
some respects, because patents impose several known social costs,
and other incentives may still propel AI innovators to pursue their
innovations without imposing those patenting costs. But an AI
world without robust patenting may contribute to consolidation in
the AI industry, and that consolidation may significantly undermine
radical AI innovation, as Part II will explore.
1. Patentable Subject Matter
One reason that patents are a poor fit in many AI contexts relates
to patent law’s subject matter requirements. In general, the subject
matter of patents is quite broad; parties can obtain patents relating
to “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composi-
tion of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”63 On its
face, the Patent Act is thus quite liberal in what parties can patent;
the only real limitation is that the invention must fit into one of the
four broad categories, which typically is not much of an obstacle at
all.64
But over the years, courts have carved out a number of exceptions
to what parties can patent.65 These exceptions to patentable subject
matter include abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenom-
ena.66 These, the Supreme Court has found, are the building blocks
63. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (setting forth patent law's subject matter requirement).
64. Gene Quinn, Patentability Overview: When Can an Invention Be Patented?
IPWATCHDOG (June 3, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/06/03/patentability-invention-
patented/id=84071/ [https://perma.cc/4M5U-56LR] (indicating that because of the breadth of
these categories, “virtually everything ha[s] been viewed as being patent-eligible subject
matter”).
65. Id.
66. Id.
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of invention, and allowing parties to patent them would inhibit
rather than encourage innovation.67 Hence, in order to further
patent law’s purpose of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and
useful Arts,”68 courts have barred patents on “the handiwork of
nature.”69
Yet determining what counts as mere abstract ideas, laws of
nature, and natural phenomena remains a difficult inquiry.70 In
reality, all inventions involve some mix of abstract ideas, laws of
nature, and natural phenomena; otherwise, the inventions would
not work in the real world.71 In part because of ongoing questions
about where to draw the line between what can and cannot be
patented, the Supreme Court has recently ruled on several of these
exceptions.72
Most recently, the Court reviewed the abstract idea exception in
its 2014 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International decision, there rul-
ing that an electronic escrow service implemented in a generic com-
puting environment was an ineligible abstract idea outside the
scope of patentable subject matter.73 In so concluding, the Alice
Court consolidated some of its earlier patentable subject matter
decisions into a two-part test for assessing exceptions to what can
be patented.74
The test’s first step is to determine whether the patent at issue
claims an ineligible abstract idea, law of nature, or physical
67. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (citation omitted).
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
69. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).
70. See Ted G. Dane, Are the Federal Circuit’s Recent Section 101 Decisions a “Specific
Improvement” in Patent Eligibility Law?, 26 FED. CIR. B.J. 331, 332, 340, 359-60 (2017)
(describing ongoing confusion about the state of patent eligibility law).
71. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012) (“For
all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas.”).
72. See Ass’n Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 577 (2013)
(holding that isolated DNA sequences were ineligible subject matter—they occur in
nature—and thus could not be patented); Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72, 92 (holding that the patent
at issue sought to claim laws of nature relating to appropriate drug dosages and thus fell
outside the scope of patentable subject matter); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 598, 611-12
(2010) (concluding that a patent covering a method for hedging against risk in energy markets
claimed a “fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce” and was
thus a mere “abstract idea” ineligible for patent protection).
73. 573 U.S. 208, 212, 227 (2014).
74. Id. at 217-18.
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phenomena.75 In the Alice decision itself, the Court confirmed some
of its earlier decisions in indicating that “fundamental ... practice[s]
long prevalent in our system of commerce” are clear examples of
abstract ideas.76 But the Court gave no further guidance about how
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and fu-
ture courts are to determine what constitutes such a fundamental
practice (or, for that matter, how to determine what counts as a
mere law of nature or physical phenomena).77 The Court did suggest
that if a patent claims “a building block of the modern economy,”
the patent is attempting to claim an ineligible abstract idea.78 But
again, the Court left it up to the USPTO and future courts to sort
out what counts as such a building block and what does not.79
The Alice test’s second step is to determine whether the patent
claim involves an “inventive concept” sufficient to transform the
ineligible abstract idea, law of nature, or physical phenomenon into
a patent-eligible application.80 Here, too, the Court fell short of
providing clarity around what counts as an inventive concept.81 The
Court merely indicated that patents claiming ineligible concepts
must include “additional featur[es]” so that “the [claim] is more than
a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].”82 In
other words, patent applicants cannot simply recite the abstract
idea “while adding the words ‘apply it.’”83 There must be “signifi-
cantly more” than just the abstract idea, law of nature, or physical
phenomenon.84 Hence, because the Court concluded in Alice that
the patent owner had merely described the abstract idea of inter-
mediated settlement as implemented in a generic computing
environment (without otherwise describing improvements to the
underlying computer technology that implemented the idea), the
patent claim failed to include an inventive concept sufficient to
75. Id. at 217.
76. Id. at 219 (citation omitted).
77. Clark D. Asay, Patenting Elasticities, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 45-46 (2017).
78. Alice, 573 U.S. at 220.
79. Asay, supra note 77, at 45-46.
80. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18.
81. Asay, supra note 77, at 46.
82. Id. at 224 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 77
(2012)).
83. Id. at 221 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72).
84. Id. at 225-26 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79).
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transform the abstract idea of escrow services into patent-eligible
subject matter.85
It is debatable what these decisions’ collective impact will
ultimately be; those questions remain an important part of an
ongoing discussion about patent law’s best way forward.86 But the
decisions have undoubtedly affected AI innovators and their patent
prospects. In particular, Alice’s two-part test for assessing patent-
able subject matter has made patenting software innovations,
including AI innovations, more challenging.87 As some scholars have
suggested, the Alice test’s standards can be read to preclude most,
if not all, existing software patents.88 And because software is at the
heart of AI inventions, Alice can often be read to preclude many if
not all AI-related patents.89
For instance, it is quite possible to frame many AI-related
inventions as simply abstract ideas implemented in generic com-
puting environments, all without improving specific “computer capa-
bilities.”90 In fact, prior to Alice, software patent drafters often
purposefully focused patent claims on the invention’s broader idea
or function, rather than narrower technological improvements, in
order to broaden the patent’s scope and therefore make it more valu-
able.91 Because of this, most, if not all, software patents—including
85. Id.
86. Congress, in fact, is currently considering amending patent law’s patentable subject
matter requirements in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions described above. See, e.g., Ryan
Davis, Sens. Appear Keen on Drafting New Patent Eligibility Law, LAW360 (Dec. 17, 2018,
10:47 PM), https://www.law360.com/ip/articles/1112205/ [https://perma.cc/RNR3-54HG].
87. Jonathan Stroud & Derek M. Kim, Debugging Software Patents After Alice, 69 S.C. L.
REV. 177, 178, 191, 205, 218 (2017) (discussing some of the difficulties post-Alice in patenting
software, while noting that software patenting, despite these difficulties, remains robust).
88. Gene Quinn, The Ramifications of Alice: A Conversation with Mark Lemley,
IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 4, 2014), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/09/04/the-ramifications-of-
alice-a-conversation-with-mark-lemley/id=51023/ [https://perma.cc/ZH34-2KRS].
89. Artificial Intelligence: What It Is and Why It Matters, SAS, https://www.sas.com/en_us/
insights/analytics/what-is-artificial-intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/59NL-HQSH]
(describing how AI works and the vital role that software plays in how it works).
90. BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (framing the
claim as the abstract idea of “considering historical usage information while inputting data,”
even though, when one reads the patent claims, the claims are certainly more detailed and
less abstract than the court articulates).
91. See Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013
WIS. L. REV. 905, 907-08 (discussing how patent drafters in the software industry prior to
Alice had increasingly claimed the broader function of their inventions, rather than the
specific implementations, in order to gain more technical territory and thereby increase their
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AI-related patents—obtained prior to Alice are likely suspect under
the Alice test.92
The Alice test may be particularly challenging for AI patent
seekers going forward. This is because by definition, many AI sys-
tems are meant to carry out some abstract idea or concept that
humans would normally perform, just in a computing environment
and with greater efficiency and precision.93 Think, for instance, of
Google’s recently debuted Duplex technology, an AI personal assis-
tant that makes real world calls on users’ behalf for things such as
restaurant reservations.94 Making appointments on others’ behalf
is clearly a fundamental practice long prevalent in society—third-
party agents have been engaging in this type of behavior for
thousands of years. Hence, it would seem quite straightforward for
the USPTO or a court to frame such an AI system as an ineligible
abstract idea. Consequently, if Google were to seek patents on this
technology, it may face challenges in describing the AI system as
broadly as would be ideal, because doing so would lead to Alice
problems.
This is not to say that patent drafters will fail to find ways to
draft around these types of issues. Indeed, parties pursuing AI-
related patents subsequent to Alice have the benefit of taking Alice’s
admonitions into account, and patent prosecutors across the globe
have begun developing drafting strategies to get around the Alice
test’s restrictions.95 But it is to say that the nature of many AI
patents’ values).
92. See BSG Tech, 899 F.3d at 1286-88 (analyzing Federal Circuit precedent under Alice
step one to conclude that patent claims must specify something more specific than a generic
computing function and that an abstract idea applied narrowly is insufficient).
93. See, e.g., Timothy Geigner, USPTO Suggests that AI Algorithms Are Patentable,
Leading to a Whole Host of IP and Ethics Questions, TECHDIRT (Apr. 30, 2018, 3:44 PM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20180419/10123139671/uspto-suggests-that-ai-algorithms-
are-patentable-leading-to-whole-host-34 [https://perma.cc/W7MY-EMYZ] (arguing that AI
algorithms are essentially laws of nature, or “math,” that should not be patent eligible); Tom
Simonite, Despite Pledging Openness, Companies Rush to Patent AI Tech, WIRED (July 31,
2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/despite-pledging-openness-companies-rush-to-
patent-ai-tech/ [https://perma.cc/5HH6-G7S2] (discussing some pushback to patenting AI
techniques because “assigning legal ownership of relatively abstract ideas doesn’t fit with the
open progress” of recent AI innovations).
94. Jason Cipriani, What Is Google Duplex?, CNET (May 24, 2018, 4:09 PM), https://
www.cnet.com/how-to/what-is-google-duplex/ [https://perma.cc/3BJT-DZYN].
95. See, e.g., Babak Nouri, A Realistic Perspective on Post-Alice Software Patent Eligibility,
IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 14, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/10/14/realistic-perspective-
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systems means that getting around the Alice test’s first step may be
particularly challenging and force patent drafters to write the
patent claims in ways that limit their breadth and thus value.96
Hence, while the Alice test’s first step certainly has not foreclosed
AI-related patents, it has made knowing how to obtain them and the
prospect of eventually enforcing them more uncertain.97
The Alice test’s second step exacerbates these concerns. Because
one can characterize many AI systems as simply some abstract idea
implemented in a typical computing environment, the second step’s
requirement that the patent go beyond merely applying or limiting
the ineligible abstract idea to a particular technological environ-
ment98 becomes challenging in many AI contexts. One can easily
describe Google Duplex, for instance, as simply implementing the
abstract idea of making appointments on behalf of others in a
generic computing environment.99 In fact, much of the media
surrounding Google Duplex describes the technology in precisely
those terms.100 Hence, because the actual nature of many AI
systems is simply a generic computing device, rather than a human,
performing a variety of common practices, Alice’s second step also
poses patenting challenges for AI innovators.
Of course, as with Alice’s first step, patent prosecutors have
begun to develop strategies for getting around Alice’s second step.101
post-alice-software-patent-eligibility/id=101977/ [https://perma.cc/398E-RM6S] (recommend-
ing that practitioners clearly articulate technically distinct aspects to obtain software patents
post-Alice); Gene Quinn, How to Patent Software in a Post Alice Era, IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 17,
2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/11/17/patent-software-post-alice/id=74750/ [https://
perma.cc/UUJ6-PFEL] (describing strategies to obtain software patents in spite of Alice).
96. John M. Rogitz, Using Narrow Claim Breadth as a Sign of Software Patent-Eligibility,
IPWATCHDOG (July 26, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/07/26/narrow-claim-software-
patent-eligibility/id=71273/ [https://perma.cc/38CY-C55A] (discussing narrowing claims as a
means by which to avoid application of Alice, as evidenced in several recent Federal Circuit
rulings). 
97. See, e.g., Daniel Nazer, Happy Birthday Alice: Four Years Busting Software Patents,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (June 22, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/06/happy-
birthday-alice-four-years-busting-software-patents [https://perma.cc/A494-N8Z8] (reviewing
data showing greater difficulty in obtaining and enforcing software patents post-Alice).
98. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 221 (2014).
99. See Cipriani, supra note 94.
100. See id.
101. See Steve Shumaker & Al Vredeveld, Specific Improvements to Computer-Related
Technology Are Not Abstract Under Alice 101 Framework, SHUMAKER SIEFFERT (May 2016),
https://www.ssiplaw.com/news/201605/specific-improvements-computer-related-technology-
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For instance, patent prosecutors have begun to emphasize specific
technological improvements in patent claims.102 By highlighting
specific technological feats carried out in furtherance of implement-
ing that idea, this strategy is meant to demonstrate that the patents
claim more than simply an ineligible abstract idea implemented in
a generic computing environment.103 Instead, according to this
approach, the claims highlight specific technological advances to the
underlying computer technology itself.104
But while such strategies may ultimately succeed, they come with
several drawbacks. First, these approaches are likely to narrow
many AI-related patents significantly.105 That narrowing may mean
that in many AI contexts, including the development of more
general, stronger forms of AI, parties will forego patenting their AI
innovations, because the patents’ narrowness means the patents are
simply not valuable enough to pursue.106 Second, as with the first
step, much about how to pass the Alice test’s second step remains
uncertain, because courts are still in the early days of defining what
is “significantly more” and goes beyond “well-understood, routine,
conventional” methods.107 In fact, the Alice decision’s lack of concrete
are-not-abstract-under-alice-101 [https://perma.cc/D9U5-S85U].
102. In fact, doing so may mean that parties need not even deal with Alice’s second step,
because that focus means the claims do not purport to claim an ineligible abstract idea, law
of nature, or physical phenomenon. See id.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. See Peter Glaser & William Gvoth, Changes in Patent Language to Ensure Eligibility
Under Alice, IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 6, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/12/06/changes-
patent-language-ensure-eligibility-alice/id=90721/ [https://perma.cc/83DN-SF5B] (indicating
that patent applicants have narrowed their claims and increased their technical disclosures
in response to Alice).
106. See Todd Hixon, For Most Small Companies Patents Are Just About Worthless, FORBES
(Oct. 4, 2013, 12:57 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/toddhixon/2013/10/04/for-most-small-
companies-patents-are-just-about-worthless/ [https://perma.cc/A9YP-YMHX] (indicating how
the narrowness of many patents diminishes their actual value, particularly for small
companies).
107. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 215, 225 (2014) (citations omitted).
These questions have a long history of answers in the context of other requirements under
patent law, such as the novelty and nonobviousness requirements. See generally Mark A.
Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1253 (2011) (describing patent law’s novelty
requirement). But presumably patentable subject matter is supposed to answer these
questions differently since it is technically a separate requirement. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 101
(2012), with 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). Because of this seeming conflation, some have argued that
patent law’s subject matter requirement should simply be eliminated. See Michael Risch,
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guidance on this question means that subsequent case law on the
question will remain in a state of some uncertainty, at least until
and if the Supreme Court again decides to step in.108
Thus, patent law’s current eligibility requirements pose an
uncertain future for AI innovators’ patent prospects. Many parties
are likely to forego patent protection altogether because current
eligibility requirements make patenting their innovations difficult
and, in some cases, impossible.109 Indeed, the lack of effective patent
protection in the AI space may disincentivize at least some AI
innovators from pursuing more far-reaching forms of AI develop-
ment, if we are to believe predominant patent law theory. And even
for those parties that could patent their AI-related innovations,
doing so may not be worth it due to the likely narrowness of the
resulting patent claims.110 Overall, Alice thus points to a future of
relatively narrow, uncertain AI-related patents. Because of these
and other realities discussed below, some and perhaps many AI
innovators are likely to opt to rely on other forms of protection, such
as trade secrecy, as discussed in Part I.B. Or, as mentioned above,
they may redirect their innovative capacities to areas where IP
protection is more certain. And while less AI patenting may yield
some positive results—fewer frivolous and abusive patent asser-
tions, for instance—it may also contribute to lower levels of AI
innovation overall, as discussed in Part II.
2. Disclosure Requirements
Patent law’s disclosure requirements also pose challenges to AI
innovators. Patent law requires those wishing to obtain a patent to
disclose important details about their invention to the USPTO as
part of the patent prosecution process.111 These requirements
Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 591 (2008).
108. The Supreme Court may not revisit its patent eligibility decisions, though, as some
have argued. See David O. Taylor, Amending Patent Eligibility, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2149,
2151 (2017) (arguing that Congress will need to amend patent eligibility requirements
because the Supreme Court is unlikely to do so).
109. See Nazer, supra note 97; see also Hixon, supra note 106.
110. See Hixon, supra note 106.
111. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 545-47 (2009) (discussing
patent law’s disclosure requirements).
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include disclosing to the USPTO enough technical details about the
invention so that a person ordinarily skilled in the field could
replicate the invention without undue experimentation and
recognize that the applicant is in possession of the claimed inven-
tion.112 These provisions also require the applicant to draft the
patent claims with enough precision so that a person ordinarily
skilled in the relevant field can ascertain the scope of the claimed
invention with reasonable certainty.113
These disclosures ultimately become part of the patent applica-
tion and issued patent, if things get that far.114 The USPTO
generally publishes patent applications eighteen months after the
application is filed even if the patent application does not ultimately
result in an issued patent.115 Issued patents are also eventually
published.116 Hence, as part of what many call the quid pro quo of
obtaining a patent’s rights of exclusion, the patentee must disclose
to the public a significant amount of technical information relating
to the patentee’s invention.117
These disclosure requirements are an obstacle for all patent
applicants. But they can be particularly difficult for AI developers
to stomach for a number of reasons. First, as discussed above, the
Supreme Court’s recent patentable subject matter decisions have
effectively forced AI patent applicants to disclose more technical
details about their innovations and to narrow their claims to specific
technological improvements to avoid rejections at the USPTO and
invalidation later in the courts.118 Yet disclosing that additional
information and narrowing their claims can significantly undermine
the patent’s value because of the more circumscribed scope of the
patent.119 This may mean that, for many AI innovators, pursuing a
112. Id. at 546.
113. See id. at 547.
114. See id. at 546.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 555.
117. Fromer, supra note 111, at 553.
118. See Michael Borella, On the Patent Eligibility of Machine Learning, MANAGING INTELL.
PROP., Dec. 17, 2018, at 3, ProQuest, File No. 2168785930 (indicating that those wishing to
patent machine learning, an important form of AI, should focus on “well-defined technological
need or advantage”); Glaser & Gvoth, supra note 105.
119. Stephen Key, In Today’s Market, Do Patents Even Matter?, FORBES (Nov. 13, 2017,
4:45 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenkey/2017/11/13/in-todays-market-do-patents-
2020] ARTIFICIAL STUPIDITY 1209
patent on their AI innovations is simply not worth it, particularly
if other forms of protection, such as trade secrecy and copyright,
provide adequate protection. This may be particularly true for AI
innovators pursuing more radical forms of AI innovation.
Second and related, for many AI systems, secrecy is a key
competitive advantage.120 Most of the foundational technology for
modern-day AI systems has been around for some time.121 Hence, for
many commercial AI systems, it is the particular implementation of
those public domain techniques that constitutes the real value of the
system.122 And, as others have documented, companies are often
quite guarded in how and what they reveal about their AI systems
to the public; they may wish to be particularly guarded about their
innovations if they develop a more far-reaching implementation of
a known AI technique.123 Consequently, disclosing details about that
implementation as part of the patenting process can undermine
whatever competitive advantage the party has.
In days gone by, obtaining a patent on the implementation, while
preserving many of the technical details as secrets, may have been
more feasible.124 But with the Supreme Court’s recent patentable
subject matter decisions, doing so is increasingly difficult because
today’s standards force AI innovators to disclose more information
about their inventions than previously.125 If a party does not pursue
a patent on the particular implementation, conversely, details about
the party’s implementation are often safe from public view because
the AI system may operate in the cloud or otherwise “behind closed
doors,” meaning that third parties, absent disclosure, have difficulty
even-matter/ [https://perma.cc/JM5H-69LV] (arguing that most patents are too narrow to even
be valuable).
120. See PASQUALE, supra note 18, at 4-8 (describing the search, reputation, and finance
sectors as relying on the secrecy of their AI systems as a key competitive advantage).
121. MICHAEL NEGNEVITSKY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A GUIDE TO INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS
4-21 (2d ed. 2005) (describing how many of the foundational algorithmic techniques in use
today were developed decades ago, but only more recently did the computing power and
financial means necessary to implement them become available). 
122. See id. at 14-17.
123. See PASQUALE, supra note 18, at 6-8.
124. See J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 941 (2011)
(describing how parties often both patent their inventions and preserve key technical details
pertaining to those patented inventions as trade secrets).
125. Glaser & Gvoth, supra note 105.
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figuring out how the AI system works.126 Hence, patent law’s
disclosure requirements, particularly in light of current patent
eligibility standards, mean that patenting AI-related inventions can
significantly undermine a party’s competitive advantages.
Again, fewer AI patents may certainly bring a number of benefits,
including less frivolous and wasteful patent litigation and, gener-
ally, greater freedom to operate.127 But again, if we are to believe
predominant patent law theory, the lack of effective patent protec-
tion may disincentivize at least some parties from pursuing more
radical forms of AI innovation. Yet even if incentives beyond patents
push parties to continue to pursue AI innovation, the relative lack
of AI patenting may contribute to a suboptimal path for AI innova-
tion, as Part II will explore.
3. Novelty and Nonobviousness
AI developers also face challenges in patenting their innovations
because of patent law’s novelty and nonobviousness standards. The
novelty requirement stipulates that an innovation must be new for
it to be patented; a party technically cannot patent something that
others have already invented.128 Hence, if some invention is already
available to the public—what patent law calls a “prior art refer-
ence”—and that available invention includes each element found in
the patent applicant’s invention, the patent application lacks
novelty and will fail.129
The nonobviousness standard is related. It stipulates that a party
cannot patent an invention if the invention is obvious in light of
what others have already invented.130 Hence, though no single prior
126. See PASQUALE, supra note 18, at 6-8 (discussing large corporations’ efforts to keep
their algorithms secret).
127. See F. Scott Kieff, On Coordinating Transactions in Intellectual Property: A Response
to Smith’s Delineating Entitlements in Information, 117 YALE L.J.F. 35 (2007), https://
www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/on-coordinating-transactions-in-intellectual-property-a-
response-to-smiths-delineating-entitlements-in-information [https://perma.cc/DGJ5-RWPG].
128. See Lemley, supra note 107, at 1255-56 (describing patent law’s basic requirement
that a patent application must claim something new).
129. See Gene Quinn, Patentability: The Novelty Requirement of 35 U.S.C. 102,
IPWATCHDOG (June 10, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/06/10/patentability-novelty-
requirement-102/id=84321/ [https://perma.cc/AG8H-5HXZ].
130. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (setting forth patent law's nonobviousness requirement).
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art reference may anticipate the patent applicant’s invention—in
other words, the applicant passes the novelty threshold—the
applicant may still be denied a patent because the application is an
obvious change to an invention or inventions that already exist.131
Thus, a party may be denied a patent on an invention if the
invention is an obvious improvement or combination of preexisting
technologies, even if it is technically different from earlier existing
inventions.132
As with the other patent law requirements reviewed, these
conditions are obstacles for all patent applicants. But in the AI
context, they may be particularly challenging. As previously
mentioned, much of the foundational technology behind current AI
systems has been available as part of the public domain for some
time.133 Indeed, some experts in the AI field complain that little if
any real innovation is happening in the AI space today,134 even if it
is clear that uses of long-standing AI techniques have improved due
to greater computational power and the availability of greater
amounts of data.135 Furthermore, the free and open source software
(FOSS) movement,136 a hugely successful collaborative approach to
software development generally, is proving fruitful with respect to
AI-related software as well, with both companies and others making
significant pieces of AI-related software available to the public.137
131. See generally Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic Approach to the
Obviousness of Inventions, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989 (2008) (discussing the obviousness
requirement).
132. See id. at 990, 1000-02.
133. See Jordan, supra note 1 (arguing that much of the current AI innovation is
spearheaded by large technology companies who focus on specific engineering tasks and rely
on algorithmic techniques that have been in use since at least the 1980s); see also Rockwell
Anyoha, The History of Artificial Intelligence, SCI. NEWS (Aug. 28, 2017), http://sitn.hms.
harvard.edu/flash/2017/history-artificial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/EES3-FF7U] (noting
that AI algorithms have not improved much in the last several decades, but improvements
in computing capacity and access to troves of data have allowed for advances in narrow forms
of AI).
134. See Jordan, supra note 1.
135. Anyoha, supra note 133.
136. Free and Open-Source Software (FOSS), TECHNOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/
definition/24181/free-and-open-source-software--foss [https://perma.cc/7KY4-3Z4Y].
137. CBINSIGHTS, WHAT’S NEXT IN AI?: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TRENDS 6 (2019)
(describing the success of several AI FOSS projects); Sam Dean, Open Source AI for Everyone:
Three Projects to Know, LINUX FOUND. (May 10, 2018), https://www.linuxfoundation.org/blog/
2018/05/open-source-ai-for-everyone-three-projects-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/DA4U-JPEF]
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This trend, too, means that AI innovators wishing to patent their AI
inventions have a larger pool of prior art to overcome.
Hence, those seeking AI-related patents may fail because their
implementations of long-standing AI techniques are not actually
new—they rely on a number of basic AI techniques that have been
in use for some time, including in the context of FOSS projects.138
Or, even, if these patent seekers pass the novelty threshold, their
innovations may often be obvious in light of the basic algorithmic
techniques AI researchers provided to the public long ago (for
instance, as already implemented in various FOSS projects).139 Even
if a company implements those technologies in a commercially
useful way, patents on those implementations may often be obvious,
even when the implementations at scale are technically new.140
These realities may mean that for those parties who pursue and
obtain patents on their AI innovations, the resulting patents may
often be quite narrow. This is not to say that pioneering AI inno-
vation is impossible.141 Indeed, the novelty and nonobviousness
requirements may be less significant hurdles for those pursuing
more radical forms of AI innovation because stronger forms of AI
would presumably pass these thresholds. But it is to say that for
those parties that mostly recycle preexisting AI technologies—
which, according to some, is much of what is currently happening
in the AI industry142—any patents that they obtain are likely to
be significantly restricted in their scope. And such narrow patent-
ing outcomes are only more likely because of the patentable sub-
ject matter and disclosure requirements discussed above. Hence,
because innovation is typically incremental, the lack of robust pat-
ent protections for AI innovation in these early days may inhibit
(discussing some of the success of the FOSS movement with respect to AI-related software).
138. See Anyoha, supra note 133 (discussing how the fundamental techniques of AI coding
have not changed for decades).
139. See id.
140. See, e.g., Khari Johnson, AI Weekley: Computing Power Is Shaping the Future of AI,
VENTUREBEAT (May 18, 2018, 7:14 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2018/05/18/ai-weekly-
computing-power-is-shaping-the-future-of-ai/ [https://perma.cc/F7NY-Z7B2] (discussing how
advances in computing power have resulted in much of the recent progress in AI innovation,
rather than new or revolutionary AI techniques).
141. See Jordan, supra note 1 (making pleas for such pioneering AI innovation).
142. See id. (discussing how most of modern AI technology is what has been called machine
learning for decades and how progress towards human-imitative AI is lagging).
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developments that ultimately lead to more general, stronger forms
of AI.
Of course, these novelty and obviousness issues may not prevent
many parties from actually obtaining AI patents if they so desire.
This is so for at least two reasons. First, the USPTO mostly looks to
prior patents when examining prior art.143 But much of the relevant
prior art in the AI space is not actually patented, so that USPTO
examiners may often miss important pieces of AI prior art entirely
when assessing AI-related patent applications.144 In fact, this has
been a long-standing complaint with regards to software patents
more generally.145 Hence, patent applicants may still obtain patents
on AI technologies that have existed for some time, as has already
been happening in the broader software space.146
Second and related, patent applicants have the upper hand in
obtaining patents, particularly if they are willing to spend the time
and money to fight it out with the USPTO.147 For instance, patent
applications are never actually finally rejected unless a patent
applicant opts to abandon the application or simply ceases pursuing
it.148 Furthermore, the onus is on the USPTO examiner to provide
reasons for rejection, meaning that well-resourced applicants can
often eventually wear down examiners into submission.149
143. Clark D. Asay, Enabling Patentless Innovation, 74 MD. L. REV. 431, 484 (2015).
144. Id. at 450.
145. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS,
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 160-64 (2008).
146. Jeremy Gillula & Daniel Nazer, Stupid Patent of the Month: Will Patents Slow
Artificial Intelligence, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2017/09/stupid-patent-month-will-patents-slow-artificial-intelligence [https://perma.
cc/7EEP-A45D].
147. Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U.
L. REV. 63, 68 (2004) (“There is no way an examiner can ever cause a determined applicant
to go away, although allowing the applicant's patent claims increases the chance that the case
will finally be disposed of.”).
148. See id. at 64 (“One of the oddest things about the United States patent system is that
it is impossible for the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ... to ever finally reject a patent
application.”); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 607
(1999) (“Because of the nature of prosecution procedure, ‘final’ rejections do not in fact always
result in the end of the examination; post-‘final’ action amendments and the like are often
permitted.”).
149. Lemley & Moore, supra note 147, at 64 (discussing how applicants can abuse the
continuation process to evade rejections and keep their patent applications alive as long as
they wish).
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But while applicants have some advantages at the USPTO,
enforcing those same patents can present a number of challenges.
For one, patent infringement defendants are strongly motivated to
find all relevant prior art in defending themselves, and, thus, are
more likely to identify the troves of nonpatented AI-related prior art
in countering that the asserted patents lack novelty or are obvious
in light of that prior art.150 Second, even though patent owners may
succeed in browbeating the USPTO into submission, the resulting
patents are often still likely to be narrow such that asserting them
successfully against defendants is difficult.151 Finally, in addition to
the traditional court system, defendants have a number of other
administrative options for having AI-related patents reviewed and
ultimately invalidated.152 Indeed, some have referred to these
administrative procedures for assessing the validity of patent claims
as “Patent Death Squad[s]” because they have proven so effective
in invalidating patent claims, particularly software patents.153
Hence, patent law’s novelty and nonobviousness requirements,
while not foreclosing the possibility of obtaining patents on the road
to stronger forms of AI, certainly make that road more difficult.
4. Patenting Elasticities
Despite these possible effects on AI patenting, it should be em-
phasized that not all patent applicants will be affected equally. In
prior work, I have argued that parties exhibit different levels of
demand for patents based on their relative resources.154 For in-
stance, large, well-resourced companies derive much of their value
150. Andrew M. Solomon et al., Defending a Patent Infringement Case by Finding Unusual
Prior Art, ACC DOCKET, Oct. 2011, at 63, 63-68 (describing several instances of defendants
exerting significant efforts to locate atypical sources of prior art in defending against patent
infringement claims).
151. Key, supra note 119.
152. Paul R. Steadman et al., Post-Issuance Patent Review, INTELL. PROP. MAG., Nov. 2011,
at 99, 100-02 (discussing a variety of patent review mechanisms that the America Invents Act
introduced in 2011).
153. Charles Sauer, Anti-Innovation Patent Tribunal Is Begging SCOTUS to Check Its
Power, THE HILL (Oct. 19, 2017, 3:30 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/356267-anti-
innovation-patent-tribunal-is-begging-scotus-to-check-its-power [https://perma.cc/7W5M-
HR82]; see Jasper L. Tran, Two Years After Alice v. CLS Bank, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 354, 358-59 (2016) (pointing to high invalidation rates of software patents at the PTAB).
154. Asay, supra note 77, at 6-9, 13-16.
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from patents in large aggregations.155 Hence, the narrowness or
strength of a particular patent in that large portfolio is not terribly
important to such a company; it is the aggregate effect of that large
portfolio that really matters.156 Furthermore, the costs of patenting
are only a small proportion of such an entity’s overall resources,
meaning that fluctuations in those costs are less likely to affect their
patenting decisions.157 Consequently, large, well-resourced compa-
nies tend to pursue large numbers of patents as a matter of course,
with their demand for such patenting exhibiting little to no change
in response to fluctuations in patent law standards.158
Smaller, more poorly resourced entities, on the other hand, are
more likely to exhibit greater fluctuations in their demand for
patents.159 For instance, increased costs of patenting are more likely
to diminish such parties’ appetite for patents, because those in-
creased costs would end up consuming a larger proportion of their
overall resources and, thus, possibly get in the way of other, more
vital business objectives.160 The relative costs (and value) of patents
is, therefore, much more likely to matter to such entities, particu-
larly if other forms of protection are less costly and provide sim-
ilar—or perhaps even greater—advantages.
Consequently, the downsides of the current patent system as
they relate to AI innovation may disproportionately affect poorly
resourced AI innovators: the growing relative costs of patenting
may push increasingly more such parties to forego seeking pat-
ents on their AI innovations, instead relying on other forms of
protection when available, while their larger, well-resourced com-
petitors go about their patenting business as usual. Or, the down-
sides of patenting may push poorly resourced parties out of the
AI space altogether. In fact, recent AI-related patenting data
provide some substantiation to these concerns, with a vast majority
155. Id. at 15-16, 26-27.
156. Id. at 26-27.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 15-18. See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Resilience of the Patent
System, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2016) (arguing that the patent system in general, including
demands for patents, the number issued, and the number of lawsuits filed, exhibits very little
change in response to changes in patent law standards).
159. Asay, supra note 77, at 7, 9, 13-14.
160. Id. at 12-15.
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of recent AI-related patenting activity owing to large, multinational
companies.161 Of course, large firms own the vast majority of patents
in most fields of innovation,162 so this data certainly does not prove
the above hypothesis. But other patenting data suggest that poorly
resourced companies decrease their patenting rates more than their
well-resourced counterparts in response to difficult economic cir-
cumstances.163 It stands to reason, then, that the growing relative
costs of AI patenting are more likely to diminish poorly resourced
parties’ demand for patents than the patenting activities of their
well-resourced competitors. And, to the extent that poorly resourced
AI inventors decrease their AI-related patenting while large firms
maintain or even increase theirs, that reality is likely to have
important repercussions on the overall organization of the AI
industry, as discussed in Part II below.
5. Summary
In sum, while AI-related patenting is unlikely to grind to a halt
anytime soon,164 current patent law realities may frequently curb
some AI developers’ patenting enthusiasm for at least three inter-
related reasons. First, recent developments in patent law’s subject
matter requirement have made it more difficult to obtain AI-related
161. Michael Webb et al., Some Facts of High-Tech Patenting 2, 14, 25 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24793, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24793.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7YQB-L273]; see also Dean Alderucci et al., Mapping the Movement of AI into
the Marketplace with Patent Data 3, https://www.cmu.edu/block-center/images/center-images/
AI-patent-project-media-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/NB48-Z6WJ] (showing that the vast
majority of AI-related patents are obtained by large, multinational firms, while also noting
that a large number of start-ups have recently patented AI-related innovations, though clearly
in lower overall numbers).
162. See, e.g., Anthony Breitzman, Patent Trends Among Small and Large Innovative Firms
During the 2007-2009 Recession, ROWAN DIGITAL WORKS 4, 10 (May 2013), https://rdw.rowan.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=csm_facpub [https://perma.cc/S9LG-36U6]
(finding that small firms owned between 5-8 percent of total patents in the study, whereas
larger firms in the study owned over 80 percent of the patents); Samuel Stebbins, The World’s
50 Most Innovative Companies, USA TODAY (Jan. 12, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.
com/story/money/business/2018/01/12/worlds-50-most-innovative-companies/1023095001/
[https://perma.cc/F75B-SPQ2] (describing the top fifty patent grantees from the year 2017,
each of which obtained hundreds and in some cases thousands of patents that year, and all
of which are large, multinational companies).
163. Breitzman, supra note 162, at 4, 16.
164. Webb et al., supra note 161, at 5-7 (showing a recent surge in AI-related patenting).
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patents.165 And while parties may still succeed in obtaining such
patents, those patents are likely to be narrower than ideal.166
Second, patent law’s disclosure requirements put some AI develop-
ers in a bind because the secrecy of many AI systems is a significant
competitive advantage.167 Though in the past parties have patented
inventions while withholding key technical details about the
invention from the patent application, recent patent law develop-
ments make doing so increasingly difficult.168 Third, patent law’s
novelty and nonobviousness requirements may be particularly
challenging for many AI innovators because so much of what passes
for AI innovation today is simply implementations of common AI
techniques in environments enabled by growth in computing
power.169 And while determined AI innovators may still obtain
patents, those patents may be technically invalid or otherwise
narrower than ideal in light of the existing prior art. Furthermore,
these prior art realities are more likely to come to light given new
administrative procedures for reviewing and invalidating issued
patents.170
Of course, these patenting obstacles may yield some positive
results, such as less frivolous patent litigation and greater freedom
to operate generally.171 Those results, in turn, may help propel the
AI industry towards greater levels of AI innovation. Yet the
patenting realities discussed above also seem more likely to deter
smaller entities from patenting their AI innovations than larger
firms, or motivate them to get out of the AI game altogether.172 And
that possibility may have important industrial organization and AI
innovation implications, as discussed in greater detail in Part II,
including inhibiting more radical forms of AI innovation.
165. See Tull & Miller, supra note 36, at 315-17.
166. See Key, supra note 119.
167. See PASQUALE, supra note 18, at 3-9.
168. See Hockett & Teplitskiy, supra note 36.
169. See Anyoha, supra note 133.
170. See Steadman et al., supra note 152, at 100-02.
171. See Kieff, supra note 127.
172. Asay, supra note 77, at 12-13. 
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B. Trade Secrecy
Trade secrecy is another form of legal protection upon which
many AI developers rely.173 Like patent law, trade secrecy finds its
major justification in incentivizing parties to undertake socially
beneficial activities, such as investing in the development of
valuable information that, absent trade secret protection, parties
may be reluctant to pursue.174 Ironically, trade secrecy may also
encourage parties to disclose their secret information to third
parties in pursuit of any number of commercial objectives.175
Trade secrecy is often treated as the primary alternative to patent
protection;176 parties choose one or the other, but they cannot choose
both.177 Scholars, however, have shown that parties are sometimes
able to obtain patents while still protecting some of the related
information as trade secrets.178 Such “double-dipping” certainly
remains available with respect to important parts of AI systems,
particularly the data used to train the AI systems, which is outside
the scope of patent protection.179 But as we have seen, recent
173. David A. Prange & Alyssa N. Lawson, Re-Evaluating Companies’ AI Protection
Strategies, MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 35-38 (Jan. 29, 2018), http://www.managingip.com/
Article/3783768/Re-evaluating-companies-AI-protection-strategies.html [https://perma.cc/
V62S-VSXU] (discussing the merits of trade secret protection with respect to AI inventions);
Cullen Taylor, AI Meets IP, PHARMATIMES ONLINE (Apr. 2018), http://www.pharmatimes.com/
magazine/2018/may_2018/ai_and_ip [https://perma.cc/BM56-RXRG] (noting that many AI
developers use trade secrecy to protect their algorithms, while noting that AI itself may pose
threats to this strategy by allowing the algorithms to be reverse engineered).
174. Ian Johnson, Trade Secrets: Protecting Innovation and Building Value, CPA GLOBAL
(Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.cpaglobal.com/cpa-global-blog/trade-secrets-protecting-inno
vation-and-building-value [https://perma.cc/LC4H-9XE7]. Another venerable line of thinking
justifies trade secret protection as a means of deterring wrong-doing, thus sounding in tort
principles.
175. Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61
STAN. L. REV. 311, 336 (2008) (arguing that trade secret law is actually designed to encourage
parties to disclose their trade secrets to others).
176. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1974) (discussing the
choice between patents and trade secrecy).
177. Lobel, supra note 39 (“Patents and trade secrets present opposing choices.”).
178. Anderson, supra note 124, at 941; Simon & Sichelman, supra note 37 (describing
circumstances in which patents covering data-generating inventions allow the inventors to
maintain secrecy with respect to the valuable data while patenting the means by which to
obtain that data).
179. Price, supra note 31, at 1433 (“Sets of data are not generally protectable with patents
or copyrights in the United States, but can be kept secret.”). But see Anderson, supra note 124,
at 972 & n.282.
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patentable subject matter developments, coupled with patent law’s
disclosure requirements, are forcing AI developers to more fre-
quently make a dichotomous choice as to which form of protection
they prefer.180
Going forward, more AI developers may choose trade secrecy over
patents because of trade secrecy’s relative advantages.181 To
understand these advantages, it is vital to understand some of the
primary differences between patent protection and trade secrecy, as
described below.
1. Threshold for Protection
First, parties do not pursue trade secrecy in the same way that
parties pursue patents; unlike patent law, there is no costly,
stringent application process for trade secrecy.182 Instead, a party
generally qualifies for trade secret protection in both federal and
state courts if the information they wish to protect has commercial
value, is not generally known, is not readily ascertainable, and the
party has undertaken reasonable precautions to protect the secrecy
of the information.183
Courts and commentators generally view these standards as more
lax than patent law’s related requirements; for instance, trade
secrecy’s nonascertainable and generally unknown requirements are
typically regarded as less demanding than patent law’s related
novelty and nonobviousness standards.184 In fact, multiple parties
180. See, e.g., Glaser & Gvoth, supra note 105 (highlighting a number of metrics showing
that, post-Alice, patent seekers have increased their patent disclosures and narrowed their
claims, with one implication being that maintaining previously undisclosed information as
trade secrets is now off the table); Prange & Lawson, supra note 173, at 35 (indicating that
recent changes in U.S. patent law are pushing more AI innovators to choose trade secrecy over
patent protection).
181. See Prange & Lawson, supra note 173, at 35-38 (discussing several of these
advantages).
182. Anderson, supra note 124, at 925 (noting that trade secrecy “requires no legal
formalities to obtain exclusionary rights,” whereas patent protection “involves a lengthy,
expensive process”).
183. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985) (setting forth the requirements for
trade secrecy, which the vast majority of states have adopted).
184. See, e.g., Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 422 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (5th Cir. 1970)
(indicating that relative novelty is all that is required for trade secret protection); Amberley
Co. v. Brown Co., No. 5407, 1967 WL 7522, at *11 (S.D. Ohio, Dec. 21, 1967) (holding that the
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can technically maintain the same trade secrets simultaneously,
whereas multiple parties cannot technically maintain patents on the
same invention.185 Furthermore, recent federal law changes may
have slightly increased the scope of what parties can protect as
trade secrets.186 Hence, unlike the shrinking scope of patent
protection, trade secrecy provides AI developers with a potentially
broader scope of protection in both federal and state courts.187
This broader scope of protection may be particularly advanta-
geous to AI innovators for a number of reasons. For starters, as
alluded to above, that broader scope can provide legal protection to
parts of AI systems that are outside the patent system’s ambit, such
as the training data upon which many AI systems rely.188 But even
for parts of AI systems that are otherwise patentable, trade se-
crecy’s broader scope can more readily encompass many elements of
AI systems than patent law. For instance, because much of the
foundational AI technology is in the public domain, parties that
implement that technology, even in new contexts, may face uncer-
tain patenting prospects in light of patent law’s novelty and non-
obviousness standards.189 That uncertainty could mean that many
modern-day implementations fail one or both of these requirements.
Or, even if an AI inventor is able to surmount both, the public
plaintiff had clearly met the novelty threshold for patentability, “let alone [for] trade secrecy”);
Eric R. Claeys, Private Law Theory and Corrective Justice in Trade Secrecy, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 35
n.170 (2011) (“[P]atent's novelty, utility, and non-obviousness requirements are more
demanding than trade secrecy's non-ascertainability requirement.”).
185. Chris Kokoska et al., Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property Considerations and Guidance
for Start-Ups, IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 3, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/11/03/trade-
secrets-intellectual-property-considerations-start-ups/id=102912/ [https://perma.cc/C59L-
L658] (“Multiple parties may share the same trade secret, but a trade secret ceases to exist
when it becomes common knowledge.”). Patent law, by contrast, only allows one patent per
invention, in accordance with its novelty requirement. See Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking
Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 922-24 (2011) (discussing patent law’s novelty
requirement).
186. Eric Goldman, The New ‘Defend Trade Secrets Act’ Is the Biggest IP Development in
Years, FORBES (Apr. 28, 2016, 1:04 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2016/04/28/
the-new-defend-trade-secrets-act-is-the-biggest-ip-development-in-years [https://perma.cc/
UB3Q-RMDW] (discussing how recent federal trade secret law changes have supplemented
typical state law trade secret protections with more federal options).
187. See id. (“Trade secret owners will win more cases.”).
188. See Christian Ehl, Data—The Fuel for Artificial Intelligence, MEDIUM (Jan. 14, 2018),
https://medium.com/@cehl/data-the-fuel-for-artificial-intelligence-ed90bf141372 [https://
perma.cc/2GZG-L9RL] (discussing the importantance of training data for many AI systems).
189. See supra Part I.A.3.
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domain status of the foundational AI techniques underlying the AI
innovations may mean that any patents the innovator does obtain
are quite narrow (and thus less valuable).190
Trade secrecy, on the other hand, provides such parties legal
coverage under its less demanding standards, as discussed above.
While it is no small feat to win a trade secret misappropriation
claim,191 parties can nonetheless successfully press such claims
despite their trade secrets lacking novelty or being obvious under
patent law standards.192 If a former employee left one AI company
for another, for instance, and shared how her previous employer
implemented a number of public domain AI techniques, the former
employer could successfully mount a trade secret claim against the
former employee and the new employer if the shared information
otherwise qualified as a trade secret.193 And this would be so even
if that implementation lacked novelty or was obvious in light of the
current state of AI technologies.
2. (Non)Disclosure Requirements
A second important difference between trade secrecy and patent
law relates to disclosure requirements (or lack thereof) under each
regime. Unlike patent law, trade secret protection allows, and even
requires, parties to maintain their inventions as secrets.194 In fact,
failing to do so eliminates trade secret protection going forward.195
Hence, for AI innovators that derive significant competitive
advantages by maintaining the secrecy of their systems—and much
evidence suggests this is true for many AI innovators—trade secrecy
can be much more advantageous than patent protection.196
190. See supra Part I.A.3.
191. See James Morando, Defending Trade-Secret Claims, FARELLA BRAUN & MARTEL LLP
(2008), https://www.fbm.com/content/uploads/2019/01/6154c86f-0cf6-42d3-8037-5c2f2cb0822f_
document.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9SU-F47N] (explaining that trade secret litigation is often
just as costly as patent litigation).
192. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
193. See David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly Important,
27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1091, 1101 (2012) (noting that former employees are the most likely
party to be sued under a trade secret misappropriation claim).
194. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985).
195. See Asay, supra note 77, at 22.
196. See PASQUALE, supra note 18, at 82 (explaining Google’s competitive advantage by
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Of course, for certain types of products and services, maintaining
trade secrecy can be difficult. And those difficulties may push some
innovators to pursue patents instead of trade secrecy. For instance,
if a party sells a product on the open market that incorporates or
otherwise exposes its trade secrets, then third parties purchasing
those products may be able to gain access to the trade secrets
through observation or reverse engineering.197 And doing so
typically does not count as a trade secret misappropriation, whereas
it is more likely to count as patent infringement if a patent is in
place.198 Furthermore, if a trade secret is disclosed, even inadver-
tently or through a breach of confidence, putting the genie back into
the trade secret bottle is often impossible.199
While these types of risks may push some AI innovators to choose
patent protection over trade secrecy, in many AI contexts such risks
are less of a concern. For instance, because much of modern
computing happens in the cloud,200 many AI innovators need not
directly provide the public with products incorporating their AI-
related trade secrets. Instead, those secrets are often relatively safe
on the party’s servers, from where the AI service is provided to third
parties as a hosted service.201 Hence, the risk of those trade secrets
being exposed, whether through observation or reverse engineering,
is less. In fact, because of the lack of transparency surrounding AI
systems in a number of important industries, some scholars have
complained that such AI systems are a “black box.”202
keeping their methods secret); Vincent Manancourt, Trade Secrets Better Suited to AI
Inventions than Patents, Experts Say, GLOBAL DATA REV. (Oct. 31, 2018), https://globaldata
review.com/article/1176313/trade-secrets-better-suited-to-ai-inventions-than-patents-experts-
say [https://perma.cc/6UJF-8YXX] (discussing a number of reasons that experts offer in favor
of maintaining trade secrecy for AI inventions, rather than pursuing patents).
197. See Anderson, supra note 124, at 924-25.
198. Id.
199. See id.
200. Steve Ranger, Cloud Computing Will Virtually Replace Traditional Data Centers
Within Three Years, ZDNET (Feb. 6, 2018, 11:16 AM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/cloud-com
puting-will-virtually-replace-traditional-data-centers-within-three-years/ [https://perma.cc/
4MHH-HJDJ] (discussing the dominance of cloud services).
201. Janakiram MSV, The Rise of Artificial Intelligence as a Service in the Public Cloud,
FORBES (Feb. 22, 2018, 10:13 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/janakirammsv/2018/02/22/
the-rise-of-artificial-intelligence-as-a-service-in-the-public-cloud/ [https://perma.cc/Z3CJ-
V5MD] (discussing the rise of AI as a hosted service).
202. PASQUALE, supra note 18, at 3.
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Furthermore, while the risk of rogue former employees taking an
AI company’s secrets to a competitor is real, the complexity of many
AI implementations can help reduce that risk by making it more
difficult for any given employee to walk away with everything
needed to run the AI system.203 In fact, in general the world
economy is dogged by a shortage of technologists capable of
understanding and implementing AI techniques in modern commer-
cial environments.204 While this reality may increase AI employee
mobility as firms fight over available talent (and thus contribute to
trade secret leakages), the fact remains that top-end AI talent
capable of fully understanding modern-day AI implementations
remains sparse.205
Consequently, while the risk of disclosure may persuade some AI
innovators to choose patents over trade secrecy, the certainty of
disclosure under patent law is likely to deter many AI innovators
from choosing such a path. This may be particularly so where the
risks of disclosure are diminished, as they are with many AI
products and services that operate behind closed, highly complex
doors.
3. Duration
A third difference between trade secrecy and patent protection
relates to duration. Trade secrecy can technically last forever.206
Unlike patent protection, which lasts twenty years from the date of
filing, trade secrecy has no set duration, so long as the information
remains valuable, is not generally known or readily ascertainable,
203. See, e.g., Dave Gershgorn, AI Is Now So Complex Its Creators Can’t Trust Why It
Makes Decisions, QUARTZ (Dec. 7, 2017), https://qz.com/1146753/ai-is-now-so-complex-its-
creators-cant-trust-why-it-makes-decisions/ [https://perma.cc/A28P-ZT3S] (discussing how
complicated modern AI systems have become).
204. Bernard Marr, The AI Skills Crisis and How to Close the Gap, FORBES (June 25, 2018,
2:10 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/06/25/the-ai-skills-crisis-and-how-
to-close-the-gap/ [https://perma.cc/K5ZH-U7H3].
205. Cade Metz, Tech Giants Are Paying Huge Salaries for Scarce A.I. Talent, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/22/technology/artificial-intelligence-experts-
salaries.html [https://perma.cc/S8C2-65GZ] (noting that “[i]n the entire world, fewer than
10,000 people have the skills necessary to tackle serious artificial intelligence research,” while
the number of industries seeking such talent continues to expand).
206. Anderson, supra note 124, at 924.
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and the trade secret owner continues to employ reasonable precau-
tions in protecting the information.207 In fact, the owners of Coke
have maintained its recipe as a trade secret under lock and key for
nearly one hundred years.208
In many cases, twenty years of protection may be more than
sufficient, particularly in the fast-paced world of AI innovation.209
But in others, the lure of possible infinite duration, or even shorter-
term secrecy, may be more attractive than the patent alternative
and its disclosure requirements, particularly if that secrecy
enhances a party’s lead-time advantages.210 Indeed, delays at the
USPTO can sometimes mean that a party’s secrets are disclosed
before patent protection is in place, and the lifespan of some AI
innovations may not even be as long as that gap in protection.
4. Patenting Elasticities Revisited
Trade secrecy can present AI innovators with a number of ad-
vantages vis-à-vis patent protection, as discussed above. And while
in some cases AI innovators may be able to maintain patent pro-
tection and trade secrecy simultaneously, recent developments in
patent law point to a future of more binary patent-trade secrecy
decisions.211
The resources available to an AI innovator, furthermore, seem
likely to affect which choice that innovator makes. As discussed ear-
lier, cash-strapped AI innovators, such as many start-up companies,
seem more likely to decrease their patenting activities as the rel-
ative costs of patents rise (and, impliedly, the relative value of the
207. Id.; see UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACTS § 1(4) (amended 1985).
208. Anderson, supra note 124, at 924; Ivana Kottasova, Does Formula Mystery Help Keep
Coke Afloat?, CNN (Feb. 19, 2014, 7:55 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/02/18/ business/coca-
cola-secret-formula/index.html [https://perma.cc/LED3-P3AZ]. 
209. Chad Steelberg, Why Artificial Intelligence Will Shift Human Innovation into
Overdrive, FORBES (May 10, 2018, 7:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/
2018/05/10/why-artificial-intelligence-will-shift-human-innovation-into-overdrive/ [https://
perma.cc/23QT-S4NS] (discussing how AI generally increases the speed of innovation).
210. See PASQUALE, supra note 18, at 82-83 (discussing how in the search, reputation, and
finance industries, maintaining trade secrecy with respect to their AI systems is a key
competitive advantage).
211. See David S. Levine & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Startups Use Trade Secrets?, 94 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 751, 810 (2018) (finding that tech start-ups generally show a preference for
secrecy over patenting).
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patents decreases).212 The natural and primary beneficiary of such
choices is trade secrecy.213 Indeed, the natural advantages of trade
secrecy vis-à-vis patent protection—being able to maintain the
innovations as secrets, despite a lack of novelty and being obvious,
for a possibly infinite period of time—are only likely to reinforce
such decisions for many poorly resourced companies.214
Well-capitalized parties, on the other hand, are less likely to be
concerned with the rising relative costs of patenting when choosing
between patents and trade secrecy. In many cases, trade secrecy’s
relative advantages are certain to persuade some such parties to
choose it over patent protection, regardless of the relative costs.215
But in situations where trade secrecy’s advantages are less clear,
the rising relative costs of patenting are likely to play little to no
role in affecting the party’s IP decision. Hence, well-capitalized
parties seem more likely to patent some AI innovations that poorly
capitalized parties, because of the rising relative costs of patenting,
would not.216 In Part II, I return to this theme in assessing how,
collectively, this dynamic is likely to affect AI’s industrial structure
and overall levels of AI innovation.
C. Copyright
Copyright is another form of intellectual property protection that
can be important to AI developers.217 Of the three forms of legal
protection discussed in this Article, copyright is in some ways the
easiest to obtain. Copyright automatically subsists in any original
212. See supra Part I.A.3.
213. For a review of why start-up companies often pick trade secrecy, see generally Levine
& Sichelman, supra note 211.
214. See generally id.
215. See David S. Levine, Confidentiality Creep and Opportunistic Privacy, 20 TUL. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. 11, 20, 25, 27 (2017) (discussing the lure of secrecy in general for many
companies); David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public
Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 145-50 (2007) (discussing how large companies that
provide critical infrastructure often rely on trade secrecy because of its advantages to the
company).
216. See Levine & Sichelman, supra note 211, at 761-62.
217. Andrea Weiss Jeffries & Emily J. Tait, Protecting Artificial Intelligence IP: Patents,
Trade Secrets, or Copyrights?, JONES DAY: INSIGHTS (Jan. 2018), https://www.jonesday.com/en/
insights/2018/01/protecting-artificial-intelligence-ip-patents-trad [https://perma.cc/W8EU-
LC6U] (discussing some of the ways in which copyright applies to elements of AI systems).
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work of authorship that is fixed in some tangible medium for more
than a transitory period.218 Basically, a party need merely create an
original work of authorship for copyright to apply.219 Hence, unlike
patent protection, parties need not formally apply for copyright
protection.220 Nor need parties demonstrate that the work is novel
and nonobvious in light of what others have already done, as patent
law requires.221 The work must merely include some “modicum” of
creativity—merely a mote will do—that the author independently
came up with.222 And unlike trade secrecy, a copyrighted work need
not exhibit commercial value or be kept secret.223 Instead, copyright
applies regardless of the value of the work, and mostly irrespective
of the effort a party put into creating it.224
Authors of copyrighted works obtain a number of exclusive rights
vis-à-vis the rest of the world.225 These include the rights to prohibit
others from reproducing, creating derivative works of, distributing,
218. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression ... from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated.”); see also id. § 101 (defining fixation as when the
work is embodied in a copy or phonorecord “for a period of more than transitory duration”).
219. See, e.g., Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 487-
88 (2004) (discussing how copyright today applies regardless of whether parties undertake a
series of formal registration steps, which in the past were necessary for copyright to arise).
220. Id. However, doing so comes with a number of benefits, including the right to assert
a copyright claim in federal courts, and access to enhanced remedies, among others. 17 U.S.C.
§ 411; id. § 504(b)-(c).
221. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936)
(indicating that “if by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew
Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn,” that person would be able to copyright the poem, despite the
work lacking novelty). 
222. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-47 (1991)
(indicating that originality requires independent creation and a modicum of creativity, and
that “even a slight amount [of creativity] will suffice”).
223. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of
Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1866 (1990) (“[Copyright] [p]rotection depends
on whether the work manifests authorial personality, not whether that personality
demonstrates either taste or talent.”).
224. See, e.g., Feist, 499 U.S. at 352-54 (rejecting a “sweat of the brow” basis for copyright).
225. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (listing the five primary exclusive rights for copyright owners).
Enforcing these rights in federal courts does require the copyright owner to undertake a
number of formalities with the U.S. Copyright Office, including registering the work with the
Office. Id. § 411(a) (“[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States
work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been
made.”).
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publicly performing, and publicly displaying the work.226 Remedies
for copyright infringement can be significant. In addition to possible
criminal sanctions, injunctive relief, and actual damages, the
Copyright Act includes statutory damages up to $150,000 for willful
infringement of a copyrighted work.227
These rights may help AI developers in a number of ways. For
starters, software, a primary component of any AI system, is subject
to copyright protection as a “literary work.”228 Consequently, AI
developers may rely on copyright protection to prevent third parties
from copying, modifying, distributing, or publicly performing their
AI-related software.229 This role for copyright is consistent with
predominant copyright theory, which posits that copyright, by
granting these rights, provides parties such as AI innovators with
the necessary economic incentives to invest in producing creative AI
works.230
Relatedly, copyright protection may encourage AI developers to
transact with third parties in further developing AI-related
software, as some theory suggests.231 For instance, the assurance of
copyright protection may embolden AI developers to disclose the
software to third parties in discussions about possible sales or co-
development activities.232 Copyright may also provide a coordination
mechanism for collaborative AI-related software development.233
226. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
227. Id. §§ 501-506 (delineating the types of remedies available to copyright owners).
228. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism:
Intellectual Property Implications of “Lock-Out” Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1107-09
(1995) (acknowledging computer programs as literary works and discussing some problems
with classifying software under the Copyright Act as a literary work).
229. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
230. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
(“By establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”).
231. See generally Jonathan M. Barnett, Copyright Without Creators, 9 REV. L. & ECON. 389
(2013) (arguing that copyright might be justified on the basis of providing incentives for
intermediaries, rather than the actual creators, to distribute and market the content).
232. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 615,
617 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962) (pointing to intellectual property rights as one
important means by which to ensure that third parties to whom the information is disclosed
cannot simply take it).
233. See, e.g., James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 202-
03 (2005) (discussing how the FOSS movement uses copyright for purposes of facilitating
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Indeed, in the past several decades, copyright has played this latter
role in the software industry more generally, particularly in the
context of FOSS development.234 This trend appears to continue
unabated in the AI context, as AI FOSS projects are thriving.235
Yet the role that copyright plays in the AI context depends to a
large extent on what parts of software are subject to copyright.
Indeed, despite software generally being considered a literary work
subject to copyright, software has always been a difficult copyright
fit because of its functional nature.236 As the Supreme Court has
noted, copyright is meant to incentivize and protect creative
expression, while patent protection is meant to incentivize and
protect utilitarian solutions.237 But it is not always clear which
aspects of a software program are protectable under copyright, and
which are excluded.238 Copyright law includes a number of doctrines
meant to screen out utilitarian aspects of creative works from
copyright protection.239 But applying these doctrines to software is
particularly difficult because software, by its very nature, is a
utilitarian solution to some computing problem.240 Consequently,
courts have struggled to separate the “wheat from the chaff” in the
software copyright context.241
software collaboration).
234. See generally Clark D. Asay, A Case for the Public Domain, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 753 (2013)
(explaining how FOSS developers rely on copyright to promote their collaborative software
development model, while arguing that copyright is not as necessary as is often imagined).
235. David Ramel, GitHub Report Charts Rise of Open Source AI, PURE AI (Oct. 24, 2018),
https://pureai.com/articles/2018/10/24/octoverse-ai.aspx [https://perma.cc/3UB6-9GBW]
(documenting growing numbers of AI-related FOSS projects).
236. Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2310-12 (1994) (arguing on this basis for a sui generis
legal regime for software).
237. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-05 (1879).
238. See Peter S. Menell, Rise of the API Copyright Dead?: An Updated Epitaph for
Copyright Protection of Network and Functional Features of Computer Software, 31 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 305, 308-12 (2018) (discussing court battles over the scope of copyright protection in
software programs).
239. Clark D. Asay, Intellectual Property Law Hybridization, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 65, 75,
77-78 (2016) (discussing many of these doctrines).
240. See, e.g., Clark D. Asay, Transformative Use in Software, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9,
14 (2017).
241. Pamela Samuelson, Functionality and Expression in Computer Programs: Refining
the Tests for Software Copyright Infringement, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1215, 1215 (2016)
(“Courts have struggled for decades to develop a test for judging infringement claims in
software copyright cases that distinguishes between program expression that copyright law
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For some aspects of software, however, there is greater clarity.
For instance, software is often written initially as “source code,” or
the human-readable version of the software.242 This is the version of
the software in which programmers write software programs.243 A
computer, however, cannot typically directly execute the source
code.244 Instead, what is called a compiler translates the source code
into “object code,” or the machine-readable version of the software.245
This series of 1’s and 0’s is typically the version of the software that
computing devices use to execute whatever functions the software
specifies.246
Courts have determined that both source and object code are
subject to copyright.247 In doing so, they have analogized software
code to the literal text of a book, which, if copied, would constitute
copyright infringement.248 Hence, AI programmers can count on
copyright to provide legal protection for both the object and source
code relating to their AI innovations.
But copyright goes beyond just protecting literal code.249 For
instance, suppose that someone copied the main plots and subplots
of Harry Potter, along with the main characters and events, all
without using any of the actual text or names of people and places
from Harry Potter. If copyright covered only the literal text of a
work, copycats could easily get around that restriction.250 But over
time, courts have expanded copyright protection to protect against
protects and program functionality for which copyright protection is unavailable.”); see Menell,
supra note 238, at 310-12 (arguing that after a long battle, courts largely came to a consensus,
but that consensus has recently been disrupted).
242. Object Code Definition, LINUX INFO. PROJECT (Aug. 7, 2005), http://www.linfo.org/object
_code.html [https://perma.cc/SQ34-GBKL].
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983)
(finding both object and source code subject to copyright protection as a literary work). 
248. Id. But see Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright
Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663, 675, 710,
715 (arguing against granting copyright protection to object code). 
249. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, A Fresh Look at Tests for Nonliteral Copyright
Infringement, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1821, 1824-40 (2013) (describing and critiquing tests for
nonliteral copyright infringement).
250. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX.
L. REV. 989, 1016 (1997).
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instances of “nonliteral” infringement as well, including in the
software context.251
In fact, the scope of copyright protection for software programs
may be on the rise. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
recently concluded that Google’s copying of certain elements of
Oracle’s Java software constituted copyright infringement.252
Google’s copying related to both literal elements of the Java
technology—bits of source code called application program interface
“headers”—and nonliteral components—the sequence, structure,
and organization of the Java software program.253 Prior to the
decision, a growing consensus had emerged among practitioners,
academics, and courts that these types of software components were
outside the scope of copyright, in part because they were functional
in nature.254 But with the recent Federal Circuit decision, doubts
about the extent to which copyright can protect functional aspects
of software programs have grown.255 Only recently the Supreme
Court agreed to review the case, the outcome of which could
significantly impact AI developers in any number of directions by
changing the scope of copyright as applied to software.256
Hence, going forward, AI developers may be able to rely on
copyright to protect not only the expressive elements of their AI-
related software, but, increasingly, more of the functional aspects
thereof as well.257 That reality, furthermore, may reinforce parties’
preference for trade secrecy over patent protection. This may be so
because AI developers can rely on copyright protection, which easily
coexists with trade secrecy, to provide patent-like protections
251. Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 702, 715 (2d Cir. 1992)
(recognizing the vitality of nonliteral copyright infringement principles in the software context
while rejecting their application in the case at hand); Lemley, supra note 250, at 1016.
252. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
253. Id. at 1355-56.
254. See, e.g., Menell, supra note 238, at 309 (reviewing the history of industry and court
approaches to software copyrightability).
255. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Staking the Boundaries of Software Copyrights in the
Shadow of Patents, 71 FLA. L. REV. 243, 245-46 (2019) (discussing how the decision threw into
doubt the division between patent protection and copyright protection).
256. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Hear Google and Oracle Copyright Case, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/15/us/supreme-court-google-oracle.html
[https://perma.cc/3J36-RBNK].
257. Samuelson, supra note 255, at 301-02.
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without actually having to obtain a patent.258 Hence, the natural
attractions of trade secrecy, combined with growing patent-like
protections available via copyright, may make the decision in favor
of trade secrecy over patents that much easier for many AI develop-
ers.259
Of course, copyright is generally a weaker form of protection than
patent protection.260 For instance, independent creation is a viable
defense to claims of infringement under copyright law,261 whereas
patent law provides no equivalent defense.262 Hence, AI developers
wishing to protect functional elements of their AI-related software
via copyright would have to demonstrate, among other things, that
the purported infringer actually copied the software from them
(rather than coming up with it on their own).263 But if the AI
developer is also maintaining the copyrighted software as a trade
secret, then in many cases proving that the alleged infringer had
access to the software may be impossible.264 With a patent in place,
on the other hand, the AI developer would merely need to show that
the patent covers the allegedly infringing product, regardless of
whether the alleged infringer had access to the patent owner’s AI
innovations.265
Despite this limitation, the trade secrecy-copyright combination
seems viable in a whole range of other scenarios. For instance, a
party can maintain trade secrecy while disclosing its inventions to
258. See, e.g., Comprehensive Techs. Int’l., Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 730, 736
n.7 (4th Cir. 1993) (indicating that parties can maintain copyright and trade secret claims
relating to the very same act).
259. See Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of
Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1532 (2004)
(discussing problems that arise due to overlapping intellectual property protections).
260. Asay, supra note 239, at 99.
261. For reasons why the defense under copyright law is largely illusory but may gain
greater traction in a world of AI, see Clark D. Asay, Independent Creation in a World of AI,
FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
262. Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105
MICH. L. REV. 475, 479-80 (2006) (advocating for such a defense under patent law).
263. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49
VAND. L. REV. 483, 510-12 (1996) (discussing this requirement of copyright infringement
analysis).
264. See id. at 510.
265. See Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property
Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1265 (2014) (discussing the means by which to prove
patent infringement).
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third parties, so long as the party takes reasonable precautions to
maintain the inventions’ secrecy (by, for example, having the re-
ceiving party sign a confidentiality agreement).266 Such a party
could still rely on copyright to protect its AI-related software—
including possibly functional elements thereof—from use by such
parties.267 And uses by third parties in these kinds of scenarios
may be the primary ones with which the party is concerned in any
event, since the party is guarding its secrets from everyone else.268
Trade secret law would also likely provide the party legal protec-
tions in such cases, but copyright remedies present a number of
advantages when compared to trade secret remedies.269
Furthermore, the trade secrecy-copyright combination may be
particularly enticing to parties with a more elastic demand for
patent protection, such as start-up companies. That is, given the
growing uncertainty surrounding AI patents discussed above, the
appeal of simply relying on a combination of trade secrecy and
copyright to protect an AI developer’s inventions may be particu-
larly high to those for whom the costs of patenting matter. Of
course, a party can rely on both copyright and patent protection for
the same inventions, and even in some cases maintain portions of
the invention as trade secrets.270 And parties with a less elastic
demand for patents, such as large, multinational corporations, are
more likely to maintain all types of intellectual property protections
simultaneously, when available.271 But in instances in which the
growing uncertainties and costs of patenting make a difference, such
266. Gene Quinn, Protecting a Trade Secret: Taking Precautions to Preserve Secrecy,
IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 16, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/04/16/trade-secret-preserve-
secrecy/id=68168/ [https://perma.cc/47PB-ALFN] (discussing this requirement).
267. See supra notes 247-58 and accompanying text.
268. See Quinn, supra note 266. One potential problem with maintaining trade secrecy
while also relying on copyright protection is that enforcing copyright in federal courts requires
a party to register their work with the Copyright Office, which can make maintaining trade
secrecy difficult.
269. For instance, copyright law provides for possible statutory damages. See, e.g., Pamela
Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of
Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 441 (2009) (discussing and critiquing this facet of
copyright law).
270. See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, An Alternate Approach to Channeling?, 51 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 873, 884 (2009) (discussing how parties often use each type of intellectual property to
protect different features of the same product or service).
271. See id. at 878.
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as for cash-strapped AI innovators, the combination of copyright and
trade secrecy may strike the exact right balance.272 The next Part
discusses some possible implications of these intellectual property
considerations.
II. AI’S INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
A. The Theory of the Firm
Scholars have argued that intellectual property rights—including
the types of rights available—can affect how industries organize
themselves.273 Typically, scholars have pointed to patent rights as
the most important form of intellectual property that can affect
industrial organization.274 Patent rights may affect industrial
organization by reducing (or increasing) the costs of transacting
with third parties over the provision of some good or service.275
Theory of the firm scholars typically refer to such costs collectively
as “transaction costs.”276
Whether intellectual property rights affect industrial organization
is a different question from whether intellectual property rights are
necessary to incentivize innovation. As discussed above, predomi-
nant theories of intellectual property often concentrate on this latter
272. See id.
273. See Lee, supra note 47, at 1439-42 (summarizing some of this research).
274. See, e.g., Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights
and Firm Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451, 451, 455 (2004); Jonathan M. Barnett,
Intellectual Property as a Law of Organization, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 789 (2011) (arguing
that patents enable greater firm specialization); Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The
Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm,
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575, 578-82 (arguing that the strength of patent rights can affect
transaction costs and thus firm boundaries); Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of
Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 475-76 (2005) (arguing that patent rights can help reduce
transaction costs); Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92
VA. L. REV. 123, 123 (2006) (“[S]cholarship suggests that the most important economic effects
of intellectual property may not be effects on price, but rather on industry structure.”).
275. Burk & McDonnell, supra note 274, at 617 (arguing that too weak or too strong patent
rights can also raise transaction costs); Lee, supra note 47, at 1440 (“Patents reduce several
costs of technology transactions.”).
276. Transaction cost economics is one of the primary means by which scholars assess
economic activity. For a general overview of transaction cost economics, see Oliver E.
Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 135
(Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
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question.277 This Part focuses on the former question, with a special
focus on patent rights and their possible effects on AI industrial
organization and levels of AI innovation.
Before delving specifically into how patent rights may affect
transaction costs, some background on the theory of the firm is
helpful.278 In a seminal article, Ronald Coase famously argued that
transaction cost levels in an industry can affect industrial organiza-
tion by influencing the so-called “make or buy” decision.279 This
decision is not a single event, but instead represents the type of
decision firms repeatedly face in a given industry.280 The decision
boils down to this: Should a firm in need of a good or service secure
that product from a third-party provider on the market (the so-
called buy decision) or should the firm make the product itself (the
so-called make decision)?281
If the transaction costs associated with obtaining products on the
market are relatively high, a firm is more likely to “vertical[ly]
integrat[e]” production, that is, make the product itself.282 This
integration occurs, the theory goes, because making the product is
more economically efficient than securing it from a third-party
supplier on the market.283 That “make” decision can result in hiring
additional employees to develop the products, acquiring a third-
party provider of various inputs, or some combination of both.284
Indeed, by making a market-based deal less likely, high transaction
costs similarly affect potential third-party suppliers of products by
making it more likely that potential trade partners will simply
acquire them.285 Hence, as firms elect to make products themselves
277. See supra Part I.
278. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 394-96 (1937) (setting forth
the classic articulation of the make or buy decision).
279. Id.
280. See id. at 396.
281. See id. at 395.
282. See Coase, supra note 278, at 397-98 & n.5; see also Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property
and the Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 5 (2004); Lee, supra note 47, at 1440 (indicating that
higher transaction costs encourage vertical integration).
283. Burk, supra note 282, at 6.
284. See id.
285. See id. at 6-7.
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rather than secure them from third-party suppliers, industry
consolidation intensifies.286
On the other hand, when the transaction costs associated with
obtaining products on the market are low relative to producing the
same thing internally, firms are more likely to buy that product
from a third-party supplier.287 The reason for this “buy” decision is
the mirror image of the “make” rationale: the relatively low costs
associated with a market-based transaction mean that it is more
economically efficient to secure that product from the third-party
supplier than making the same product in-house.288 As a result,
merger and acquisition activity becomes less likely due to the
benefits of economic specialization.289 Hence, lower transaction costs
can contribute to less consolidation in an industry, as specialized
firms are better able to sell their products to interested buyers as
part of a disaggregated supply chain.290
Patents may reduce transaction costs and thus encourage indus-
trial disaggregation in a number of ways. For instance, if a party
wishes to engage third parties in commercial discussions about its
inventive activities, patents can lower that party’s risk of those
third parties taking and using information about its inventive activ-
ities without compensation.291 Relatedly, patents can be a useful
mechanism for “codifying” inventive ideas, thereby facilitating
licensing and sales activities relating to those inventive ideas292 and
better enabling innovators to capture the value of their inno-
vations.293 By enhancing remedial options, patents can also reduce
transaction costs by providing patent owners with safeguards
286. See generally Graeme K. Deans et al., The Consolidation Curve, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec.
2002), https://hbr.org/2002/12/the-consolidation-curve [https://perma.cc/4FZU-VVL7] (dis-
cussing the phases of consolidation that industries typically experience).
287. See Coase, supra note 278, at 395.
288. See id.
289. See id.; see also Robert P. Merges, Autonomy and Independence: The Normative Face
of Transaction Costs, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 145, 148-49 (2011) (arguing in favor of economic
specialization both in terms of efficiency and the benefits of autonomy).
290. See Merges, supra note 289, at 149-50.
291. Arrow, supra note 232, at 617; Merges, supra note 57, at 1503.
292. Arora & Merges, supra note 274, at 455 (indicating that strong intellectual property
rights enhance firms’ capabilities of appropriating the value of their inventions).
293. See Teece, supra note 45, at 296 (arguing that weak appropriability regimes may
contribute to vertical integration as a means to better capture the value of innovations).
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against third parties that may otherwise take advantage of con-
tractual incompleteness.294
On the other hand, insufficient patent rights may raise transac-
tion costs and thus encourage industry consolidation in several
ways.295 For example, weak or ineffective patent protection may lead
parties to invest in excessive, inefficient self-help measures,
including expensive physical and personnel safeguards, in an
attempt to protect the value of their inventive information.296 Weak
patent rights may also result in higher transaction costs as parties
seek to overcompensate for that weakness—and the risks of
uncompensated appropriation by third parties—through extreme
contractual protections.297 Ineffective patent protections may
contribute to higher transaction costs by enhancing the likelihood
of costly and drawn-out litigation.298 Overall, ineffective patent
protection may thus raise transaction costs as innovators encounter
greater difficulties in capturing the value of their innovations.299
And one possible response to those relatively high transaction costs
is industry consolidation as parties make, rather than buy, inputs
on the market.
The resulting industrial organization, in turn, can influence
whether an industry innovates at optimal levels.300 For instance, a
294. Merges, supra note 57, at 1486.
295. Burk & McDonnell, supra note 274, at 617.
296. See Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation and Incarceration: An
Economic Analysis of Criminal Intellectual Property Law, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 275, 292 (2014)
(describing the types of expensive measures parties may take to protect their property should
patent rights prove ineffective). The preceding citation suggests that property owners take
these types of self-help measures when they are protecting their property as trade secrets. See
id. But parties may and often do undertake such precautions even when they plan to patent
their inventions, since for the first eighteen months of a patent application’s existence, it is
not disclosed to the public. USPTO Will Begin Publishing Patent Applications, USPTO (Nov.
27, 2000), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/uspto-will-begin-publishing-patent-
applications [https://perma.cc/DP4A-C473]. Furthermore, even when the application is pub-
lished, plenty of information relating to the invention may be missing from the application,
such that protecting it with safeguards may be warranted. See Anderson, supra note 124, at
944.
297. Cf. Merges, supra note 57, at 1486.
298. See Kieff, supra note 127 (highlighting this phenomenon in Japan, which is
characterized by mostly weak patent rights).
299. Teece, supra note 45, at 301-02 (indicating that for this reason, parties are more likely
to vertically integrate as they seek to capture more effectively the value of their innovations).
300. See Lee, supra note 47, at 1440-41 nn.19-29 (reviewing some of this literature).
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good amount of evidence suggests that industrial disaggregation—
not consolidation—is the best means by which to achieve optimal
innovation levels in an industry.301 This may be for several reasons.
Smaller firms are typically more nimble and innovative than larger
incumbents.302 Smaller, more specialized firms may also simply
have greater incentives to produce high-quality products, because
their livelihoods depend on it.303 Specialization allows for a varie-
ty of efficiencies in supply chain economics.304 Furthermore, eco-
nomic disaggregation may provide for greater competition among a
variety of firms, and adequate competitive forces in an industry are
typically indicative of overall industrial economic health.305 Even
outside of economic efficiency considerations, other reasons may
exist for favoring specialization over consolidation.306
Hence, the types of intellectual property protections available
within an industry are important in part because they can affect an
industry’s organization and, ultimately, whether that industry
yields socially beneficial levels.307 And importantly, intellectual
property rights can have these effects regardless of whether patents
and other types of intellectual property are necessary to incentivize
inventive activities. In the following Section, I examine how these
considerations are likely to play out in light of AI’s intellectual
property realities, as explored in Part I above.
301. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION 199-203 (1975)
(suggesting that larger, more bureaucratic firms lose significant innovative capacity).
302. Lee, supra note 47, at 1441.
303. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 140-41 (1985)
(discussing the high-powered incentives of production in the context of specialized firms
compared to the “lower-powered” incentives present in intrafirm production); Merges, supra
note 289, at 150 (discussing Williamson’s identification of specialized firms’ “high-powered
incentives” to produce higher quality goods and services).
304. Arora & Merges, supra note 274, at 470 (discussing some of the benefits of
specialization in supply chain economics); Barnett, supra note 274, at 814-15 (discussing a
variety of benefits of economic specialization, particularly in the context of the semiconductor
industry).
305. For this reason, most countries have some form of antitrust law. But for an argument
that less integration is not always better for competition purposes, see Paul L. Robertson &
Richard N. Langlois, Innovation, Networks, and Vertical Integration, 24 RES. POL’Y 543, 550
(1995).
306. Merges, supra note 289, at 150 (discussing considerations beyond economic efficiency
that may favor economic specialization).
307. See id.
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B. AI’s Industrial Organization
The AI industry’s boundaries can be difficult to pinpoint because
so many companies have begun to use AI in their daily business
practices.308 Indeed, “AI as a Service” allows companies with little
AI expertise to utilize AI technologies in their everyday oper-
ations.309 But consuming AI does not make a company part of the
AI industry.310 Instead, this Article focuses on the set of companies
that actively develop and deploy AI products.311
That AI industry is growing and is only expected to continue to do
so.312 Venture funding for AI start-ups has “turned into a torrent,”
and the industry has experienced “exponential growth” recently in
the overall number of AI start-ups.313 AI-related merger and
acquisition activity, and fierce competitions over available AI talent,
have also heated up.314 This Section examines how intellectual
property rights may affect that growth by influencing how the
industry ultimately organizes itself.
308. Louis Columbus, 80% of Enterprises Are Investing in AI Today, FORBES (Oct. 16, 2017,
6:41 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2017/10/16/80-of-enterprises-are-
investing-in-ai-today/ [https://perma.cc/XCB6-XFFY] (discussing the widespread use of AI in
modern-day enterprises).
309. See MSV, supra note 201.
310. Sriram Subramanian, Modern AI Stack & AI as a Service Consumption Models,
MEDIUM (Mar. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/clouddon/modern-ai-stack-ai-service-consump
tion-models-f9957dce7b25 [https://perma.cc/FL4R-ZAX4] (discussing AI as a service, where
consumers simply use AI without otherwise implementing any of the technologies).
311. For some different approaches to tackling this issue, see Daniel Faggella, Artificial
Intelligence Industry—An Overview by Segment, EMERJ (Apr. 25, 2019), https://emerj.com/ai-
sector-overviews/artificial-intelligence-industry-an-overview-by-segment/ [https://perma.cc/
QUL2-Z22K].
312. Artificial Intelligence Market Size Is Projected to Be Around US $191 Billion by 2024,
MARKETWATCH (Aug. 8, 2018, 12:25 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/press-release/arti
ficial-intelligence-market-size-is-projected-to-be-around-us-191-billion-by-2024-2018-08-08
[https://perma.cc/ZA75-UMKW].
313. Joe McKendrick, How Fast Is Artificial Intelligence Growing? Look at the Key
Bellwethers, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2018, 12:26 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joemckendrick/
2018/12/19/how-fast-is-artificial-intelligence-growing-look-at-the-key-bellwethers/
[https://perma.cc/2GRB-SPKY] (quoting Yoav Shoham et al., The Artificial Intelligence Index:
2018 Annual Report, AI INDEX STEERING COMMITTEE 31 (Dec. 2018), http://cdn.aiindex.
org/2018/AI%20Index%202018%20Annual%20Report.pdf).
314. See The Race for AI: Here Are the Tech Giants Rushing to Snap Up Artificial
Intelligence Startups, CBINSIGHTS (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/top-
acquirers-ai-startups-ma-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/PP44-EMBY] (discussing acquisition
trends amongst large technology companies).
2020] ARTIFICIAL STUPIDITY 1239
1. AI’s Intellectual Property Conundrum
As discussed in Part I, patenting AI-related innovations can
present a number of challenges, such that patent protection in the
AI space is in some respects weaker than ideal.315 Furthermore,
trade secrecy presents a number of advantages for many AI
innovators.316 And copyright, when combined with trade secrecy,
may increasingly help make up for whatever patent shortfalls
exist.317
How have these realities affected patenting in the AI industry?
Some data suggest they may not have affected AI patenting much
at all.318 For instance, a recent study shows that AI-related patent-
ing has steadily grown, particularly since 2012, when improvements
in computational power dramatically increased the ability to use
long-standing AI technologies in a variety of new settings.319
Yet the fact that parties continue to seek and obtain AI-related
patents is not indicative of effective patent protection for the covered
AI technologies.320 As discussed earlier, large, well-capitalized
parties are likely to continue seeking and obtaining many AI
patents, irrespective of the state of AI patenting standards, as they
build expansive patent portfolios; the value of patenting for such
entities lies in the portfolio, not the strength of individual patents.321
Furthermore, such patent seekers are often able to “browbeat” the
315. See also Prange & Lawson, supra note 173, at 37 (discussing challenges and benefits
of protecting with patents and trade secrets).
316. Id.
317. See Samuelson, supra note 255, at 294.
318. See, e.g., Webb et al., supra note 161, at 6 (showing the rise of AI-related patenting in
recent years).
319. Id.; see Dario Amodei & Danny Hernandez, AI and Compute, OPENAI (May 16, 2018),
https://openai.com/blog/ai-and-compute/ [https://perma.cc/U9QN-9EUA].
320. See Lemley, supra note 158, at 14 (discussing how changes in patent law that have
both strengthened and weakened patent rights do not appear to affect overall patent-related
behavior).
321. See Alfonso Gambardella et al., The Economic Value of Patent Portfolios, 26 J. ECON.
& MGMT. STRATEGY 735, 751 (2017) (highlighting empirical analysis showing that building
large patent portfolios yields more value to a company than redirecting resources into
obtaining fewer but higher value patents); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent
Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 31-32 (2005) (highlighting reasons why companies build large
patent portfolios, even when the expected value of any given patent is relatively low).
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patent office into granting their patent applications,322 even in cases
where courts are likely to invalidate those same patents later on.323
Start-ups may also continue patenting some of their AI innova-
tions, regardless of whether obtaining the patents is costly or the
resulting patents are ineffective or otherwise weak.324 For instance,
some evidence suggests that start-up companies frequently obtain
patents as a means by which to attract capital or otherwise
communicate information about themselves to various markets.325
Hence, start-ups may continue to obtain AI-related patents, even if
the companies never foresee being able to enforce those same
patents, because that was not their primary purpose in obtaining
the patents.326
Thus, the fact that companies both large and small continue to
patent at least some of their AI innovations is a separate question
from whether those patents provide their owners with effective
patent protection. Based on this Article’s earlier analysis, it would
appear that even granted AI patents are often highly susceptible to
invalidation in the courts due to issues with subject matter eligibil-
ity, novelty, and nonobviousness.327 Or, even if the patents are
otherwise valid, they may often be quite narrow in light of the AI
prior art, meaning competitors have an easier time avoiding the
patents.328 Hence, robust AI patenting is consistent with patent law
developments that render those same patents weak or largely
ineffective as enforcement tools.329 And with the AI market flooded
with such weak patent protections, parties wishing to strike an
322. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
323. See Key, supra note 119 (discussing shortcomings of patent protection).
324. See id. (describing shortfalls and benefits of patenting innovations).
325. See J. Jonas Anderson, Nontechnical Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1575 (2016)
(arguing that patents often disclose nontechnical information to the world that is sometimes
more valuable than the patent’s technical details); Asay, supra note 58, at 265 (discussing how
parties use patents to signal information to capital, labor, and product markets); Clarisa
Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 653 (2002) (arguing that parties often obtain
patents in order to signal to capital markets that they are innovative and thus worthy of
investing in). 
326. See, e.g., Long, supra note 325, at 679.
327. See supra Parts I.A.1, I.A.3.
328. See supra Part I.A.3.
329. Cf. Lemley, supra note 158, at 42 (pointing to consistent patenting behavior, despite
fluctuations in the strength of patent rights).
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arms-length deal are more likely to face relatively high transaction
costs in doing so.330
What is more, aggregate patenting data may often mask the
reality that smaller companies are, in fact, decreasing their AI
patenting relative to their larger counterparts.331 Indeed, at least
some of the recent AI patenting studies suggest that the vast
majority of AI-related patenting is happening in the halls of
technology monoliths such as Google, Amazon, IBM, Intel, and
others.332 Such patenting discrepancies, too, can lead to higher
industry transaction costs as start-ups more frequently rely on trade
secrecy.333
Finally, the fact remains that for many AI innovations, patenting
remains a suboptimal intellectual property strategy because of
patent law’s disclosure requirements.334 Trade secrecy, in contrast,
provides some legal protections without the need to share with the
world a party’s AI details.335 And though trade secrecy may provide
such advantages, it is also typically associated with higher transac-
tion costs as parties undertake extensive, costly measures to guard
that secrecy.336
2. Theory of the AI Firm
Weak patent protection, and often an outright preference for
trade secrecy, may thus increase the transaction costs associated
with buying an AI input on the market relative to the costs of
making the input internally.337 Those relatively high transaction
costs, in turn, can push more parties to vertically integrate,338
330. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 321, at 62 (describing transaction costs
with patent portfolios).
331. See Asay, supra note 77, at 56-57.
332. Webb et al., supra note 161, at 17-18.
333. See Levine & Sichelman, supra note 211, at 779-80 (discussing small and medium
sized parties’ preference for trade secrecy).
334. See Prange & Lawson, supra note 173, at 37.
335. Id. at 38.
336. See Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 296, at 323 (discussing costs of secrecy).
337. Cf. Levy, supra note 44, at 439 (explaining that parties’ decisions to integrate
vertically are influenced by costs of transacting and internal production).
338. See id.
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thereby resulting in significant AI industry consolidation and thus
suboptimal levels of AI innovation.
For instance, start-up companies, when reaching a certain level
of maturation, principally exit the market in one of two ways.339
Either they make an initial public offering (IPO), in which they
become a public company and raise additional capital to finance
their ongoing operations through the stock market. Or, they are
acquired by or merge with another company, typically a larger in-
cumbent in the same industry.340 Start-up companies that have
greater difficulty in protecting their innovations through patent
protection seem more likely to view acquisition by a larger industry
incumbent as their best exit strategy.341 Among other reasons, this
is because the transaction costs associated with protecting their
innovations, either through secrecy or even in drawn-out patent
litigation, are simply too high.342
Large incumbents may similarly favor acquisition, rather than a
market-based transaction, for a number of reasons. A veil of secrecy
undertaken by the start-up, for instance, may make an arm’s
length transaction too difficult and costly.343 An acquisition, on the
other hand, increases transparency and thus access to the start-
up company’s AI-related innovations344 (as well as, importantly,
the talented personnel behind them and their tacit knowledge re-
lating to the AI inventions).345 Furthermore, in many cases large in-
cumbents prefer maintaining secrecy relating to their AI-related
339. Martin Zwilling, Five Smart Exit Strategies, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 5, 2011, 10:30 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/startup-exits-should-be-positive-and-planned-early-2011-1
[https://perma.cc/XVK2-PGN2] (discussing common exit strategies and listing a merger and
acquisition or an initial public offering as the most popular).
340. Id.
341. See Barnett, supra note 274, at 816 (discussing how adequate patent protection
enables firm specialization).
342. See supra Part II.A.
343. See Barnett, supra note 274, at 799-800 (describing how uncertainty caused by trade
secrets can complicate deals and deter investments).
344. Cf. Arrow, supra note 232, at 615 (discussing demand for information).
345. See Natalie Gagliordi, Box Acqui-Hires Team from Machine Learning Startup
Butter.ai, ZDNET (July 10, 2018, 12:10 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/box-acqui-hires-
team-from-machine-learning-startup-butter-ai/ [https://perma.cc/CK45-X374] (discussing one
such recent acquisition whose purpose largely aimed at acquiring the AI talent associated
with the start-up).
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developments, such that acquiring the AI start-up outright makes
preserving that overall secrecy that much easier.346
To further illustrate these points, consider a highly stylized
situation between an AI start-up and a larger AI incumbent.
Suppose that the start-up company, like many start-ups, has a
relatively modest patent portfolio.347 Furthermore, because of the
perceived weakness of AI patents, the start-up has more frequently
relied on trade secrecy to protect its AI innovations than it other-
wise might have.348 The result is a mix of trade secrecy, a smattering
of relatively weak AI patents, and possibly copyright protection for
certain elements of their AI systems.349
Now consider the incumbent. The incumbent has protected many
of its AI innovations with patents in an attempt to build a large
patent portfolio.350 Nonetheless, similar to the start-up, its AI-
related patents are relatively weak and narrow, even if numerous.
Furthermore, in many cases the incumbent prefers to rely on trade
secrecy, all in order to avoid patent law’s increasingly demanding
disclosure requirements.351
If the incumbent becomes interested in the start-up’s AI technolo-
gies, the different intellectual property profiles of the two parties
are likely to affect their ultimate relationship.352 For instance, from
the start-up company’s perspective, the lack of effective patent
protection makes it riskier to engage with the incumbent in an
arm’s length deal.353 Contractual solutions are notoriously weak;354
the patents the party does own are likely to be narrow or otherwise
ineffective;355 and trade secrecy comes with its own problems,
including difficulties of policing and enforcement.356 All of these
346. See PASQUALE, supra note 18, at 7-8.
347. See Levine & Sichelman, supra note 211, at 761-62 (discussing why start-up com-
panies might decide against filing for patents).
348. Cf. id.
349. Asay, supra note 77, at 7.
350. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 321, at 53-55 (discussing how large firms
often rely on large patent portfolios in deriving value from patenting).
351. See supra Part I.A-B.
352. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 321, at 8, 10 (describing relationships
between large and small companies with different intellectual property profiles).
353. See id.
354. See Barnett, supra note 274, at 798.
355. See Prange & Lawson, supra note 173, at 37.
356. See Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application
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factors ultimately mean that transacting with the incumbent is
likely to entail significant costs, which the start-up may not be in
a position to bear.357
These costs, in fact, are likely to be exacerbated in light of the
incumbent’s intellectual property profile. The incumbent’s vast
patent portfolio means the relative ineffectiveness of any given AI
patent doesn’t really matter; it can wield that portfolio against the
start-up collectively.358 That leverage is amplified in light of the
small set of weak patents the start-up possesses.359 The incumbent’s
preference for trade secrecy in some cases also is likely to increase
the difficulties in transactions between the parties, as in some cases
neither party may be willing to share everything that is necessary
to actually strike an arm’s length deal.360 Hence, the result is that,
if both parties want to reach a deal, that deal is more likely to be in
the form of a merger or acquisition, not an arm’s length contractual
relationship. Indeed, the high transaction costs associated with
weak patent protections, unequal bargaining leverages, and a clear
preference for trade secrecy in many cases make this integration
choice a natural one.361
In fact, the evidence we have suggests this type of consolidation
has quickly become the norm in the AI industry, with some arguing
that consolidation in the AI industry has happened faster than is
typical in other industries.362 In 2017, for instance, of the 120 AI
start-up companies that exited the market, 115 did so through
Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1046, 1077-78 (1989) (discussing some of the difficulties in
establishing and enforcing trade secret protection in the context of certain software
technologies).
357. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 321, at 62 (describing transaction costs
with patent portfolios).
358. Id. at 53-55.
359. Id. at 55.
360. See Andreas Panagopoulos & In-Uck Park, Patenting vs. Secrecy for Startups and the
Trade of Patents as Negotiating Assets 6 (Univ. of Crete, Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No.
1610, 2015), http://economics.soc.uoc.gr/wpa/docs/1610.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6WT-THJM]
(discussing how trade secrecy is often an inferior mechanism for encouraging disclosure).
361. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 321, at 50-51 (describing strategy of
acquiring rather than licensing to grow patent portfolios).
362. Vinod Iyengar, Why AI Consolidation Will Create the Worst Monopoly in US History,
TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 24, 2016, 9:00 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2016/08/24/why-ai-
consolidation-will-create-the-worst-monopoly-in-us-history/ [https://perma.cc/UBM8-8FA7]
(arguing on the basis of recent merger and acquisition activity in the AI industry that the
industry has consolidated faster than is typical).
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acquisition by a larger incumbent such as Google, Amazon, or
IBM.363 AI start-up acquisition activity has also significantly ac-
celerated, particularly since 2012, as the large technology behe-
moths race to gobble up as many promising AI start-up companies
as possible.364 This acquisition activity is also occurring fairly early
in the life-cycle of many of these acquisition targets, meaning that
industry consolidation is happening before these companies can
even develop and offer their own AI products.365 And while a gen-
erally cooling IPO market almost undoubtedly has something to do
with these trends,366 intellectual property considerations would also
seem to bear on these developments, for the reasons discussed
above.367
Industry consolidation manifests itself in other ways as well. For
instance, Amazon, Google, Microsoft, IBM, and others offer compre-
hensive AI services on demand, which require little to no engineer-
ing expertise for third parties to use.368 In certain fields such as
generalized image, video, speech and text AI tools, in fact, venture
capitalists are reluctant to fund companies wishing to offer related
services because the technology monoliths’ lead and relative
advantages are so significant.369 These companies have been able to
build these “full-stack” AI solutions in part because of their frequent
acquisitions of available AI technology and talent.370 Hence, in a
number of important AI product markets, industry consolidation is
363. Vorhies, supra note 46.
364. See, e.g., Holden Page, AI Startups Take the Money and Run as Big Tech Comes
Acquiring, CRUNCHBASE NEWS (Aug. 9, 2017), https://news.crunchbase.com/news/ai-startups-
take-money-run-big-tech-comes-acquiring/ [https://perma.cc/E2NF-CHV5] (discussing accel-
eration of acquisition since 2012); see also McKendrick, supra note 313 (discussing growth of
AI start-ups relative to all start-ups).
365. Iyengar, supra note 362.
366. See Frank Partnoy, The Death of the IPO, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2018), https://www.
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/11/private-inequity/570808/ [https://perma.cc/LL7T-
9ZXW] (discussing declining numbers of IPOs generally).
367. See supra Part II.B.1.
368. See Vorhies, supra note 46 (discussing how large technology companies often offer full-
stack AI solutions on demand, which makes competing with them difficult for a number of
reasons).
369. See id.
370. See id.
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so deep that finding someone to fund a competitive start-up has
become nearly impossible.371
That industry consolidation, in turn, is a recipe for suboptimal AI
innovation. Of course, AI industry consolidation in the hands of a
few may offer any number of benefits, including the ability for third
parties to quickly access and use, without significant AI expertise,
the full-stack AI solutions that many technology giants offer.372 Be
that as it may, a good amount of evidence suggests that heavy
industry consolidation can result in poor innovation levels in an
industry, as competitive forces wane and the technology monoliths,
burdened as they are with multiple layers of bureaucracy, struggle
to innovate as they once did.373 The result, in the end, may be a form
of ongoing artificial stupidity, rather than the promised general AI
that continues to elude society.374
Of course, it is worth repeating that intellectual property
protections are certainly not the only factor influencing consolida-
tion in the AI industry. AI innovation heavily depends on comple-
mentary assets such as access to large amounts of data and
computational power, assets that large incumbents have an easier
time accumulating.375 Hence, much of the consolidation may be
occurring because larger firms are in a more realistic position to
engage in AI innovation due to their access to such assets. Signifi-
cant economic risk more generally may also be pushing start-up
companies to jump into the relatively safe embrace of a larger
incumbent more frequently than they otherwise would.376 Yet weak
appropriability regimes, such as ineffective patent protection,
exacerbate these factors, making consolidation more likely. And
though large firms may be in the most realistic position to engage
in AI innovation, that does not mean they are in the best position to
do so.
371. See id.
372. Id.
373. See Lee, supra note 47, at 1490.
374. See Jordan, supra note 1 (discussing the general lack of innovation in the AI space,
and the failure to realize general AI).
375. Teece, supra note 45.
376. Nguyen Huy Kham, Economic Storm Clouds, WORLD ECON. F., https://reports.we
forum.org/global-risks-2018/economic-storm-clouds/ [https://perma.cc/XA2P-KE64] (discussing
ongoing world-wide economic risk factors).
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III. IMPLICATIONS
Having considered how the intellectual property protections
available to AI innovators are likely to affect AI industrial organ-
ization and the industry’s overall levels of innovation, this final
Part briefly examines some possible solutions to these issues.
A. Strengthening AI Patents
One possibility for addressing some of the issues discussed above
is to strengthen AI patent rights. Strengthening AI-related patent
rights could theoretically incentivize parties to undertake more far-
reaching AI innovation,377 as well as enable greater economic
specialization by helping reduce market-based transaction costs.378
That greater economic specialization, in turn, could help the AI
industry disaggregate, thereby increasing competitive forces therein
and thus improving overall levels of AI innovation.379
The most obvious route to strengthening patents in the AI space
lies in reforming the patentable subject matter requirement. In fact,
Congress is currently investigating such a solution.380 Furthermore,
the current USPTO director has also recently attempted to provide
clearer patentable subject matter guidance so that parties seeking
patents may face fewer patentable subject matter hurdles.381
The main thrust of such changes seems to center on making
patentable subject matter more expansive, perhaps even returning
the state of the law back to what it was before the Supreme Court
most recently intervened.382 Yet while such a change may make AI
377. See Lemley, supra note 158, at 52 (articulating that the theory underlying patent
rights is to incentivize parties to pursue innovation that they would otherwise forego).
378. See Barnett, supra note 274, at 811.
379. See Lee, supra note 47, at 1435, 1490.
380. Kirk M. Hartung, Congress Considers a Patent Eligibility Overhaul, MCKEE, VORHEES
& SEASE, PLC (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.filewrapper.com/filewrapper/congress-considers-
patent-eligibility-overhaul [https://perma.cc/AE9M-HXS7].
381. Benjamin T. Hemmelgarn & Adriana L. Burgy, Error 101: Director Iancu Wants to
Clarify Patentable Subject Matter, PROSECUTION FIRST BLOG (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.
finnegan.com/en/insights/blogs/prosecution-first/error-101-director-iancu-wants-to-clarify-
patentable-subject-matter.html [https://perma.cc/3NMA-LY9B].
382. See, e.g., Kevin A. Rieffel, What Is Director Iancu Proposing the USPTO Do for § 101
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patenting more feasible and the resulting patents more valuable,
that change may reintroduce many of the problems the Supreme
Court sought to address in joining the patentable subject matter
discussion in the first place.
For instance, as previously mentioned, prior to the Supreme
Court’s decisions, software patent owners often drafted their patent
claims so as to cover broad functions rather than specific technologi-
cal improvements.383 This meant that the software marketplace was
burdened with many overbroad patents that implicated tech-
nologies already in use for some time.384 The Supreme Court’s
decisions were meant at least in part to push back against this
trend by strengthening the exceptions to the patentable subject
matter requirement.385 And while the Court may have expanded
those exceptions too far, as some claim,386 it remains dubious that
returning back to the state of things prior to the Court’s decisions
is a better way forward.
Indeed, the state of software patenting prior to the Supreme
Court’s patentable subject matter decisions had significantly
contributed to the rise of so-called patent trolls, or parties that do
not practice their patents, instead suing others that do.387 While
there is certainly debate about whether such parties provide any
Analysis?, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/09/25/director-
iancu-proposing-uspto-§101-analysis/id=101682/ [https://perma.cc/46HS-4CRM] (discussing
Director Iancu’s desire to focus the inquiry on all relevant Supreme Court precedent, not just
the most recent decisions).
383. See Lemley, supra note 91, at 907-08.
384. Id. at 930-31.
385. See Timothy B. Lee, Why a 40-Year-Old SCOTUS Ruling Against Software Patents
Still Matters Today, ARS TECHNICA (June 21, 2018, 4:15 PM), https://arstechnica.com/features/
2018/06/why-the-supreme-courts-software-patent-ban-didnt-last/ [https://perma.cc/8KUZ-
9J2D].
386. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Did the Supreme Court Intentionally Destroy the U.S. Patent
System?, IPWATCHDOG (May 22, 2018), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/05/22/did-the-
supreme-court-intentionally-destroy-the-u-s-patent-system/id=97514/ [https://perma.cc/C7D9-
BSJV].
387. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2118-20, 2123 (2013) (discussing patent trolls and their prevalence in
the software industry).
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social value,388 there is a good amount of evidence suggesting that
in the net they impose an overall tax on innovating parties.389
Since the Court’s patentable subject matter decisions, the up-
roar over patent trolls has died down some.390 Patent trolling has
become less pronounced, and whatever ills it entails seem to have
lessened.391 While a number of legal changes account for this state
of affairs,392 the Supreme Court’s patentable subject matter deci-
sions, by making broad software patents more difficult to obtain and
enforce, almost certainly had something to do with it.393
Hence, returning the state of patentable subject matter law to
how it was prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions would run the
risk of reinvigorating the patent troll market, particularly in the AI
space. Indeed, as AI continues to envelop every sector of society, the
number of possible patent troll targets would increase exponen-
tially.394 And by raising the overall costs of carrying out AI research
and development without providing a clear, offsetting benefit, such
a development would arguably impede AI innovation, not promote
it.
It is also the case that in many AI contexts, parties simply prefer
trade secrecy over patent protection.395 In such scenarios, it would
thus seem that strengthening AI patents would have little to no
388. See, e.g., Stephen H. Haber & Seth H. Werfel, Patent Trolls as Financial
Intermediaries? Experimental Evidence, 149 ECON. LETTERS 64, 65-66 (2016) (presenting some
evidence supporting the argument that patent trolls serve useful roles).
389. See, e.g., James Bessen, The Evidence Is In: Patent Trolls Do Hurt Innovation, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Nov. 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/07/the-evidence-is-in-patent-trolls-do-hurt-
innovation [https://perma.cc/SX9H-3K7P] (summarizing evidence pointing to the harms that
patent trolls impose).
390. See Eduardo Porter, Patent ‘Trolls’ Recede as Threat to Innovation. Will Justices
Change That?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/21/business/
economy/patents-trolls-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/664C-TLQ3].
391. See id.
392. See, e.g., Larry Downes, The U.S. Supreme Court Is Reining in Patent Trolls, Which
Is a Win for Innovation, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 2, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/06/the-u-s-
supreme-court-is-reining-in-patent-trolls-which-is-a-win-for-innovation [https://perma.cc/
NXD6-AB85]; Mike Montgomery, SCOTUS Smacks Down Patent Trolls, FORBES (June 2,
2017, 4:50 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikemontgomery/2017/06/02/scotus-smack-
down-patent-trolls/ [https://perma.cc/J674-5BSM].
393. See Quinn, supra note 386.
394. For concerns that AI patenting may already be getting in the way of AI innovation,
see, for example, Gillula & Nazer, supra note 146 (reviewing some recently issued AI patents
and their potential overbreadth). 
395. See Fromer, supra note 41, at 728-30.
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effect on the parties’ intellectual property choices. That preference
for trade secrecy, in turn, is likely to continue to push the industry
towards consolidation in many cases, regardless of the relative
strength of AI patents. This is so for the reasons discussed above:
trade secrecy tends to increase transaction costs relative to patent
protection, meaning that vertical integration becomes the more
economically efficient means of producing the AI solution, even if it
falls short of being the most innovative one.396
Indeed, this point is buttressed by the fact that important parts
of AI systems are either not protectable under patent law (e.g., the
training data) or only barely so because of the existing AI prior
art.397 And as discussed above, some of those complementary assets
are more feasible to access when the industry is consolidated.
Hence, strengthening AI patents by expanding patent eligibility is
not a panacea for the AI industry. Indeed, doing so may actively
harm AI innovation by reviving an AI patent troll market. Instead,
the real solution may lie outside of intellectual property rights
altogether.
B. Strengthening Antitrust Laws
A natural candidate for reducing industry consolidation, and
thereby potentially increasing levels of AI innovation, is antitrust
law. In general, antitrust laws are meant to “promote vigorous
competition and protect consumers from anticompetitive mergers
and business practices.”398 To that end, both the Federal Trade
Commission and the Department of Justice enforce federal antitrust
laws in an effort to protect consumer welfare, including by way of
limiting industry consolidation that is deemed to undermine socially
beneficial innovation.399 Hence, antitrust is one possible means by
396. See supra Part II.A (discussing ways in which trade secrecy may increase transaction
costs, and thus promote industry consolidation, relative to patent rights).
397. See supra Parts I.A-B (discussing these AI patenting considerations in detail).
398. Guide to Antitrust Laws, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/
guide-antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/JT6V-56NR].
399. Competitive Effects, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-
antitrust-laws/mergers/competitive-effects [https://perma.cc/4G26-UF67]; The Enforcers, FTC,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/enforcers [https://
perma.cc/77PD-UBV7].
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which to thwart AI industry consolidation if that consolidation’s
effect is to impede valuable AI innovation.
Yet relying on antitrust law to upend artificial stupidity seems
dubious for several reasons. For starters, in general leading scholars
often view U.S. antitrust law as rather anemic,400 particularly when
compared to more robust conceptions of antitrust law found in
Europe and elsewhere.401 Hence, U.S. antitrust authorities have
typically been reluctant to intervene unless a clear harm to
consumer welfare is evident.402
But AI industry consolidation, it can be argued, provides benefits
to consumers, not harms, in the form of relatively cheap, full-stack
AI solutions.403 Indeed, at least some evidence suggests that
consolidation can lead to improved levels of innovation, thereby
benefiting consumers, in at least two ways. First, market power can
theoretically provide firms with greater security and capital “in the
pursuit of ambitious and long-term-oriented” research and develop-
ment activities.404 And those long-term research and development
efforts may very well bring consumers some benefits, at least
ultimately.
Second, some recent evidence suggests that consolidation can and
often does lead to technological “synergies” that contribute to
innovation.405 Those synergies, too, can benefit consumers. For these
and other reasons, U.S. antitrust authorities seem unlikely to
successfully intervene as AI consolidation occurs and, in fact, have
400. See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND
EXECUTION 1-7 (2005) (discussing the history of antitrust law in the United States, its retreat
to a single focus on consumer welfare, and a lack of recent Supreme Court oversight).
401. See Sean Heather, Five Things European Antitrust Gets Wrong, U.S. CHAMBER COM.
(July 20, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.uschamber.com/series/above-the-fold/five-things-
european-antitrust-gets-wrong [https://perma.cc/86N6-YWVD] (arguing that European
antitrust law goes too far in a number of ways); Sanford M. Pastroff & Tilman Kuhn, Antitrust
Law in the United States and European Union: Key Differences, A.B.A., https://www.american
bar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/tyl/topics/antitrust/antitrust-law-the-united-
states-and-european-union-key-differences/ [https://perma.cc/66MD-H9GC] (discussing some
of the differences between U.S. and European antitrust laws).
402. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 400, at 7.
403. See supra notes 356-60 and accompanying text.
404. Merges, supra note 47, at 52.
405. Jan Bena & Kai Li, Corporate Innovations and Mergers and Acquisitions, 69 J. FIN.
1923, 1931 1949-55 (2014) (studying 1762 mergers from 1984 to 2006 and finding that
technological synergies resulting from those mergers often resulted in higher levels of
innovation).
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been reluctant to bring antitrust investigations against the main AI
behemoths in the past.406
Furthermore, while some may envision a more robust future role
for U.S. antitrust law,407 vast changes to those laws do not appear
imminent.408 Hence, unlike patent law’s patentable subject matter
requirement, which may very well receive a makeover in the near
term,409 the basic U.S. approach to antitrust enforcement seems
unlikely to change anytime soon in a way that would effectively
limit AI industry consolidation.
Consequently, absent other solutions, AI industry consolidation
seems to promise continuing artificial stupidity. Indeed, despite
providing enough possible consumer benefits to stave off antitrust
oversight, industry consolidation is typically considered a major
hurdle, if not outright impediment, to radical, far-reaching inno-
vation.410 As Robert Merges has noted, “[L]arge companies rarely
succeed in paradigm-shifting innovations.”411 Yet this type of in-
novation is precisely what is needed in the AI field, as many experts
attest.412 With intellectual property and antitrust laws providing
little, if any, promise on this front, the next Section looks to a
possibly more promising source of radical AI innovation.
C. Government AI
One of history’s important lessons is that dramatic, far-reaching
innovation often requires significant backing from state actors.413 A
406. See Brian Fung, Amazon, Facebook and Google Are All Being Looked at for Antitrust
Violations, Trump Says, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2018, 9:15 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/technology/2018/11/05/amazon-facebook-google-are-all-being-looked-antitrust-violations-
trump-says/ [https://perma.cc/6QKB-UBQR] (discussing some recent antitrust overtures from
President Trump that to date have gone nowhere, at least in the United States).
407. See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, A Modest Enterprise, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 415, 416 (2006).
408. Jay Levine & Devan Flahive, Is It Time to Change the Focus of the Antitrust Laws?
The Debate Is Heating Up, ANTITRUST L. SOURCE (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.antitrust
lawsource.com/2017/09/is-it-time-to-change-the-focus-of-the-antitrust-laws-the-debate-is-
heating-up/ [https://perma.cc/T7NE-Q9SC] (discussing several reasons why the current U.S.
approach to antitrust has lasted for four decades and is unlikely to change anytime soon).
409. See Hartung, supra note 380.
410. See Merges, supra note 47, at 52, 59.
411. Id. at 51.
412. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 1.
413. Mariana Mazzucato, State of Innovation: Busting the Private-Sector Myth, NEW
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version of the Internet, for instance, was first developed by the U.S.
Department of Defense before making its commercial debut in the
1980s.414 Heavy government funding and applied research are also
largely responsible for significant innovations in GPS, aviation
technologies, space technologies, cellular technologies, nuclear pow-
er, nanotechnology, infant formula, bar codes, vehicle tires, micro-
chips, touch screens, vaccines, wind turbines, and many more.415 In
the pharmaceutical sector, government backing is said to be “re-
sponsible for 75 per cent of the most innovative new drugs annu-
ally.”416
The reason behind this is at least somewhat intuitive: “[T]ruly
radical innovation needs patient, long-term, committed finance.
This type of finance is hard to find in the short-termist private
sector.”417 Hence, traditional banks, venture capitalists, and other
sources of potential funding are often reluctant to invest in innova-
tions that only promise returns, if at all, after a long period of risky
trial and error.418 In part for this reason, commentators often
criticize venture capitalists for primarily investing in projects that
promise oversized returns in the near or immediate future.419 And
while such an approach may sometimes prove profitable, it makes
it difficult for innovative start-up companies to obtain financing for
the type of long-term innovation capable of yielding radical discover-
ies.
SCIENTIST (Aug. 21, 2013), https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21929310-200-state-of-
innovation-busting-the-private-sector-myth/ [https://perma.cc/BSD8-98CF] (discussing the
state’s role in a number of important historical innovations).
414. See Evan Andrews, Who Invented the Internet?, HISTORY (Dec. 18, 2013), https://www.
history.com/news/who-invented-the-internet [https://perma.cc/C2HH-BBN3].
415. 10 World-Changing Inventions from Government Funding, FISCAL TIMES (Mar. 7,
2013), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Media/Slideshow/2013/03/07/10-government-funded-
inventions [https://perma.cc/L7HM-FJGD]; Liz Jacobs, GPS, Lithium Batteries, the Internet,
Cellular Technology, Airbags: A Q&A About How Governments Often Fuel Innovation,
TEDBLOG (Oct. 28, 2013, 11:34 AM), https://blog.ted.com/qa-mariana-mazzucato-governments-
often-fuel-innovation/ [https://perma.cc/M58W-3Z52].
416. Mazzucato, supra note 413.
417. Jacobs, supra note 415.
418. Mazzucato, supra note 413.
419. See, e.g., Eric Paley, Toxic VC and the Marginal-Dollar Problem, TECHCRUNCH (Oct.
26, 2017, 5:00 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2017/10/26/toxic-vc-and-the-marginal-dollar-
problem/ [https://perma.cc/8GLC-TVXT] (discussing the problems arising from such an
approach).
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Admittedly, the public-private sector debate—that is, whether the
government should lead the way, or instead defer to private
entrepreneurs, who are often viewed as more capable of innovative
activity420—is an enormous one that this Article cannot hope to
settle. Nor need it. Instead, the point here is simply that for truly
radical innovation—such as general AI—often both sides are
necessary. Hence, we should view government involvement in
promoting such radical AI innovation as an important complement
to private sector activity, rather than a competitor to or outright
replacement for it.
Indeed, a recent review of economic history suggests that for
many significant, disruptive innovations, early government support
was crucial because clear commercial possibilities were not yet ripe
during those early stages of development.421 Consequently, neither
investors nor private sector companies were willing to take on the
financial risks necessary to spur on the relevant innovation.422 By
ensuring that the innovations got off the ground, the government
thus played a critical role in the early phases of many significant
innovations.423 Later, when commercial applications of the innova-
tions became clearer, the private sector often took the reins,
contributing much to the further development of these technolo-
gies.424 Indeed, many of the foundational technologies underlying
innovations such as Apple’s iPhone may have never seen the light
of day without early government involvement.425 Apple’s later
refinements of those technologies certainly provided a number of
socially beneficial innovations.426 But without early government
420. See, e.g., Jeff Madrick, Innovation: The Government Was Crucial After All, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS (Apr. 24, 2014), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/04/24/innovation-government-
was-crucial-after-all/ [https://perma.cc/7JHV-53VS].
421. See MARIANNA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS.
PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS 5-7 (2014).
422. See id.
423. See id. at 21.
424. See id. at 20-21.
425. See id. at 87-88; see also WILLIAM H. JANEWAY, DOING CAPITALISM IN THE INNOVATION
ECONOMY: RECONFIGURING THE THREE-PLAYER GAME BETWEEN MARKETS, SPECULATORS AND
THE STATE 294 (2d ed. 2018) (discussing the important role of the state in helping to foster the
development of many important technologies).
426. MAZZUCATO, supra note 421, at 87-88.
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involvement, society may have never experienced those later
contributions.427
The U.S. government, and governments across the world, remain
a significant source of funding for basic research.428 In fact, most of
today’s AI innovations initially started out in universities.429 Yet the
U.S. government’s share of that funding has fallen precipitously in
recent years.430 What is more, its absolute level of funding has also
flattened in the last decade, even as basic research needs grow.431
And constant threats to cut additional funding mean that flattening
could eventually nosedive.432 The lessons of history suggest that if
we are to avoid enduring artificial stupidity and make real break-
throughs in achieving general AI, government backing is necessary,
and preferably in large doses.433 This does not mean that private
sector entrepreneurs will have no role to play in achieving general
AI—they certainly will, and undoubtedly will have much to con-
tribute. But as the history of many significant innovations teaches,
often their breakthroughs will only come on the shoulders of
governmental involvement.434 Or in other words, the private sector’s
427. Id.
428. What Is the Optimal Balance Between Basic and Applied Research?, UNESCO (Feb.
16, 2017), http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-view/news/what_is_the_opti
mal_balance_between_basic_and_applied_resear [https://perma.cc/GAP8-XHZG].
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contributions will only be possible by “building on top of [the]
technological infrastructure built by the public sector.”435
Furthermore, the public sector needs greater space to innovate
before commercial interests enter the fray. For instance, universi-
ties have become so enamored with trying to commercialize their
innovations that that commercialization impulse often directs what
types of AI innovation university researchers pursue.436 Often, those
commercial interests push for narrower, immediately useful forms
of AI rather than more general, less predictable ones.437 Hence,
greater government funding, with at least some distance from the
immediate need to commercialize the funded research activities,
seems to be the best way forward to realizing more radical forms of
AI innovation.
CONCLUSION
If achieving true AI remains a worthy pursuit, then U.S. innova-
tion policy is in need of a reboot. As this Article has examined,
intellectual property rights, particularly patents, are a poor fit for
many types of AI development.438 Indeed, for many AI innovators,
trade secrecy is often a better choice.439 These intellectual property
realities, furthermore, have industrial organization repercussions,
as they are likely to contribute to heavy AI industry consolidation.440
That consolidation, in turn, is likely to contribute to enduring
artificial stupidity.
But neither strengthening patent rights, nor relying on other
forms of law such as antitrust, seem to hold much promise as
solutions. Strengthening patent rights is likely to reintroduce a
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number of unintended problems in the AI marketplace that would
ultimately tax AI innovators more than help them.441 And antitrust
law, with its strict focus on consumer welfare, is unlikely to have
much teeth in the AI context.442 Instead, as with many radical
innovations before it, achieving general AI will require significant
government backing that goes beyond mere lip service.443 Otherwise,
artificial stupidity, though valuable in many contexts, may remain
our reality for some time to come.
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